GHSA-3HRH-PFW6-9M5X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 17:59 – Updated: 2026-06-04 17:59
VLAI
Summary
Hono: Cookie helper does not sanitize sameSite and priority, allowing Set-Cookie injection
Details

Summary

The serialize() function in hono/cookie validates domain and path options against characters that corrupt Set-Cookie header syntax (;, \r, \n), but does not apply the same validation to sameSite and priority. An application that passes user-controlled input into either option may produce a Set-Cookie response header containing attacker-chosen additional attributes.

Details

When constructing a Set-Cookie header value, serialize() appends the sameSite and priority option values directly into the output string after a presentation-only transformation (capitalizing the first character). Although the TypeScript type signature constrains these options to specific string literals, that constraint is not enforced at runtime; any string value, including one containing ; or line-feed characters, passes through unchanged.

The validation guard that rejects ;, \r, and \n from domain and path is not applied to sameSite or priority. An application that passes a request-derived value to either option therefore provides an injection point into the header line.

This issue arises when an application passes user-controlled input to the sameSite or priority option of setCookie() or serialize().

Impact

An attacker who can control the sameSite or priority option value may inject additional attributes into a Set-Cookie response header.

This may lead to:

  • Cookie attribute injection — overriding Domain, Path, HttpOnly, Secure, or Max-Age for the affected cookie
  • HTTP response header injection on runtimes that do not strictly validate header values, enabling a second attacker-controlled Set-Cookie header in the same response

This issue affects applications that pass user-derived input into the sameSite or priority option of hono/cookie serialization functions.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "hono"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.12.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47675"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-113",
      "CWE-1287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T17:59:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T17:16:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `serialize()` function in `hono/cookie` validates `domain` and `path` options against characters that corrupt `Set-Cookie` header syntax (`;`, `\\r`, `\\n`), but does not apply the same validation to `sameSite` and `priority`. An application that passes user-controlled input into either option may produce a `Set-Cookie` response header containing attacker-chosen additional attributes.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen constructing a `Set-Cookie` header value, `serialize()` appends the `sameSite` and `priority` option values directly into the output string after a presentation-only transformation (capitalizing the first character). Although the TypeScript type signature constrains these options to specific string literals, that constraint is not enforced at runtime; any string value, including one containing `;` or line-feed characters, passes through unchanged.\n\nThe validation guard that rejects `;`, `\\r`, and `\\n` from `domain` and `path` is not applied to `sameSite` or `priority`. An application that passes a request-derived value to either option therefore provides an injection point into the header line.\n\nThis issue arises when an application passes user-controlled input to the `sameSite` or `priority` option of `setCookie()` or `serialize()`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can control the `sameSite` or `priority` option value may inject additional attributes into a `Set-Cookie` response header.\n\nThis may lead to:\n\n- Cookie attribute injection \u2014 overriding `Domain`, `Path`, `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, or `Max-Age` for the affected cookie\n- HTTP response header injection on runtimes that do not strictly validate header values, enabling a second attacker-controlled `Set-Cookie` header in the same response\n\nThis issue affects applications that pass user-derived input into the `sameSite` or `priority` option of `hono/cookie` serialization functions.",
  "id": "GHSA-3hrh-pfw6-9m5x",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T17:59:25Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T17:59:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-3hrh-pfw6-9m5x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47675"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/905aedbc20661e0e2fa378783a7ec44a5c3df43d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.12.21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hono: Cookie helper does not sanitize sameSite and priority, allowing Set-Cookie injection"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.