GHSA-2QJV-P2GC-MJG2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-02 23:15
VLAI
Summary
Apache Airflow Task SDK Callback deserialization can import arbitrary modules in the scheduler
Details

Apache Airflow's Task SDK rebuilt a Callback object from serialized data by re-running its constructor, which imports the module named by the stored callback path. Because SyncCallback is itself an Airflow class it passes the default allowed_deserialization_classes allow-list, so tightening that setting does not help. A Dag author — who controls a task instance's next_kwargs through the task execution API — can therefore cause an arbitrary module to be imported inside the scheduler process, when the scheduler's awaiting_input timeout sweep deserializes that value. No non-default configuration is required; the sweep runs unconditionally. Versions before 3.3.0 are not affected: the class existed, but the scheduler sweep that reaches it did not. This is a separate code path from CVE-2026-58076 and CVE-2026-67260, which cover different gadgets reaching deserialization — applying either of those fixes does not address this one. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "apache-airflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67587"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T23:15:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-12T16:17:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Apache Airflow\u0027s Task SDK rebuilt a `Callback` object from serialized data by re-running its constructor, which imports the module named by the stored callback path. Because `SyncCallback` is itself an Airflow class it passes the default `allowed_deserialization_classes` allow-list, so tightening that setting does not help. A Dag author \u2014 who controls a task instance\u0027s `next_kwargs` through the task execution API \u2014 can therefore cause an arbitrary module to be imported inside the scheduler process, when the scheduler\u0027s `awaiting_input` timeout sweep deserializes that value. No non-default configuration is required; the sweep runs unconditionally. Versions before 3.3.0 are not affected: the class existed, but the scheduler sweep that reaches it did not. This is a separate code path from CVE-2026-58076 and CVE-2026-67260, which cover different gadgets reaching deserialization \u2014 applying either of those fixes does not address this one. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-2qjv-p2gc-mjg2",
  "modified": "2026-10-02T23:15:27Z",
  "published": "2026-08-12T18:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67587"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/70704"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/1baee0bf987eb220f15398e43572e1ed819a0130"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/2b598cb8b0570c941633be3d16a7eb912f73180c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/releases/tag/3.3.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/apache-airflow/PYSEC-2026-3708.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/o00ww4n69qojvsckb464dtwd2nhzy6t0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-67260"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Airflow Task SDK Callback deserialization can import arbitrary modules in the scheduler"
}



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