GHSA-2Q54-JXW8-PQQR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer
mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the (re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event:
sinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len];
len = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies - (u8 *)&event->frame_control;
sinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) - (u16)len;
event->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated, and the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into adapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the kmalloc()'d struct mwifiex_adapter.
On the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with cfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each element header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes actually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past event_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a slab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie). An event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction negative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len. The same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest over-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification.
A malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver such an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode.
Validate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the header or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the event was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len, a payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length, so it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic MWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the transport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE] rather than the actually-received length because the transports store the event differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in event_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single fixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path analogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617 ("wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets").
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68326"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer\n\nmwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the\n(re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event:\n\n\tsinfo-\u003eassoc_req_ies = \u0026event-\u003edata[len];\n\tlen = (u8 *)sinfo-\u003eassoc_req_ies - (u8 *)\u0026event-\u003eframe_control;\n\tsinfo-\u003eassoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event-\u003elen) - (u16)len;\n\nevent-\u003elen is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated,\nand the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into\nadapter-\u003eevent_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the\nkmalloc()\u0027d struct mwifiex_adapter.\n\nOn the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with\ncfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each\nelement header. A firmware-reported event-\u003elen larger than the bytes\nactually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past\nevent_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a\nslab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie).\nAn event-\u003elen smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction\nnegative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len.\nThe same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest\nover-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the\nNL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification.\n\nA malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver\nsuch an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode.\n\nValidate event-\u003elen before use: reject a length that underflows the\nheader or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the\nevent was copied into. event-\u003elen here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len,\na payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length,\nso it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic\nMWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the\ntransport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE]\nrather than the actually-received length because the transports store the\nevent differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in\nevent_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single\nfixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path\nanalogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617\n(\"wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets\").",
"id": "GHSA-2q54-jxw8-pqqr",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:14Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68326"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ae00b6d9a6c82eb3de151d9b04ed59e06cc100f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3f47d7c75ddad1a14621a309286f9fae3cba191"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a616616b938f7922a93e79bef16b4643c57c0922"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad26c75ae25749313248f06510ebe43b5bf4adcc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6766d7ea43edf5de9d5a572bc58b631d09efe4b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d21464d93f8ba464dc3d7b4b31c6e0adcd9f659c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7e93d3e8c240bdb70c41e79d169d74dfb442843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0858bfc7d3cab411a447b88e3ef970e575032c9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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