GHSA-2FPH-6V5W-89HH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-24 16:50 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:59
VLAI
Summary
Craft CMS is Vulnerable to Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Malicious Attached Behavior
Details

Summary

A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in Craft CMS 5.x and 4.x that bypasses the security fixes for GHSA-7jx7-3846-m7w7 and GHSA-255j-qw47-wjh5. This vulnerability can be exploited by any authenticated user with control panel access.

The existing patches add cleanseConfig() to assembleLayoutFromPost() and various FieldsController actions to strip Yii2 behavior/event injection keys (as and on prefixed keys). However, the fieldLayouts parameter in ElementIndexesController::actionFilterHud() is passed directly to FieldLayout::createFromConfig() without any sanitization, enabling the same behavior injection attack chain.

Impact

  • Attack Type: Remote Code Execution (RCE)
  • Authentication Required: Authenticated user with control panel access (accessCp permission)

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

In ElementIndexesController::actionFilterHud() (line 493-494), the fieldLayouts body parameter is passed to FieldLayout::createFromConfig() without cleanseConfig():

// ElementIndexesController.php:485-494
if ($conditionConfig) {
    $conditionConfig = Component::cleanseConfig($conditionConfig); // conditionConfig IS cleansed
    $condition = $conditionsService->createCondition($conditionConfig);
} else {
    $condition = $this->elementType()::createCondition();
}

if (!empty($fieldLayouts)) {
    // fieldLayouts is NOT cleansed!
    $condition->setFieldLayouts(array_map(
        fn(array $config) => FieldLayout::createFromConfig($config),
        $fieldLayouts
    ));
}

Note the inconsistency: conditionConfig is sanitized with cleanseConfig(), but fieldLayouts is not.

Attack Chain

  1. Send a fieldLayouts array containing config with "as <name>" prefixed keys
  2. FieldLayout::createFromConfig($config) -> new self($config) -> Model::__construct($config)
  3. App::configure($this, $config) processes each key
  4. "as rce" key -> Component::__set("as rce", $value) -> Yii::createObject($value) -> instantiates AttributeTypecastBehavior and attaches it to the FieldLayout
  5. "on *" key -> registers a wildcard event handler
  6. parent::__construct() -> init() -> setTabs([]) -> getAvailableNativeFields() -> trigger(EVENT_DEFINE_NATIVE_FIELDS)
  7. The wildcard handler fires -> AttributeTypecastBehavior::beforeSave() -> typecastAttributes()
  8. $this->owner->typecastBeforeSave -> resolved via Component::__get() -> returns the command string from the behavior's own property
  9. call_user_func([ConsoleProcessus::class, 'execute'], $command) -> shell_exec($command)

Prerequisites

  • A user account with control panel access
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.9.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "craftcms/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.9.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33157"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-470"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-24T16:50:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T18:16:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in Craft CMS 5.x and 4.x that bypasses the security fixes for GHSA-7jx7-3846-m7w7 and GHSA-255j-qw47-wjh5. This vulnerability can be exploited by any authenticated user with control panel access.\n\nThe existing patches add `cleanseConfig()` to `assembleLayoutFromPost()` and various `FieldsController` actions to strip Yii2 behavior/event injection keys (`as ` and `on ` prefixed keys). However, the `fieldLayouts` parameter in `ElementIndexesController::actionFilterHud()` is passed directly to `FieldLayout::createFromConfig()` without any sanitization, enabling the same behavior injection attack chain.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Attack Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE)\n- **Authentication Required**: Authenticated user with control panel access (`accessCp` permission)\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\nIn `ElementIndexesController::actionFilterHud()` (line 493-494), the `fieldLayouts` body parameter is passed to `FieldLayout::createFromConfig()` without `cleanseConfig()`:\n\n```php\n// ElementIndexesController.php:485-494\nif ($conditionConfig) {\n    $conditionConfig = Component::cleanseConfig($conditionConfig); // conditionConfig IS cleansed\n    $condition = $conditionsService-\u003ecreateCondition($conditionConfig);\n} else {\n    $condition = $this-\u003eelementType()::createCondition();\n}\n\nif (!empty($fieldLayouts)) {\n    // fieldLayouts is NOT cleansed!\n    $condition-\u003esetFieldLayouts(array_map(\n        fn(array $config) =\u003e FieldLayout::createFromConfig($config),\n        $fieldLayouts\n    ));\n}\n```\n\nNote the inconsistency: `conditionConfig` is sanitized with `cleanseConfig()`, but `fieldLayouts` is not.\n\n### Attack Chain\n\n1. Send a `fieldLayouts` array containing config with `\"as \u003cname\u003e\"` prefixed keys\n2. `FieldLayout::createFromConfig($config)` -\u003e `new self($config)` -\u003e `Model::__construct($config)`\n3. `App::configure($this, $config)` processes each key\n4. `\"as rce\"` key -\u003e `Component::__set(\"as rce\", $value)` -\u003e `Yii::createObject($value)` -\u003e instantiates `AttributeTypecastBehavior` and attaches it to the FieldLayout\n5. `\"on *\"` key -\u003e registers a wildcard event handler\n6. `parent::__construct()` -\u003e `init()` -\u003e `setTabs([])` -\u003e `getAvailableNativeFields()` -\u003e `trigger(EVENT_DEFINE_NATIVE_FIELDS)`\n7. The wildcard handler fires -\u003e `AttributeTypecastBehavior::beforeSave()` -\u003e `typecastAttributes()`\n8. `$this-\u003eowner-\u003etypecastBeforeSave` -\u003e resolved via `Component::__get()` -\u003e returns the command string from the behavior\u0027s own property\n9. `call_user_func([ConsoleProcessus::class, \u0027execute\u0027], $command)` -\u003e `shell_exec($command)`\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- A user account with control panel access",
  "id": "GHSA-2fph-6v5w-89hh",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T20:59:38Z",
  "published": "2026-03-24T16:50:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-2fph-6v5w-89hh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33157"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/97e90b4bdee369c1af3ca77a77531132df240e4e"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-255j-qw47-wjh5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7jx7-3846-m7w7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/releases/tag/5.9.13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Craft CMS is Vulnerable to Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Malicious Attached Behavior"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…