GCVE-123-2026-0001
Vulnerability from gna-123 – Published: 2026-09-25 00:00 – Updated: 2026-09-25 07:35| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Best Practice Software | Bp Premier |
Affected:
1.12.1.1023
Affected: 1.12.3.1042 Affected: 1.13.1.1080 Affected: 1.13.1.1096 Affected: 1.14.0.1114 Unaffected: 1.14.1.1129 , < * (custom) cpe:2.3:a:best_practice_software:bp_premier:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:best_practice_software:bp_premier:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Bp Premier",
"vendor": "Best Practice Software",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.12.1.1023"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.12.3.1042"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.13.1.1080"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.13.1.1096"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.14.0.1114"
},
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1.14.1.1129",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Independent researcher who elected to remain unnamed."
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Andrew Tunnecliffe (CI-ISAC Australia)."
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "CI-ISAC Australia, National Intelligence Office."
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Best Practice Software Bp Premier uses a hardcoded Microsoft SQL Server administrative password that is shared across all installations; in affected versions, the credential could not be changed without breaking the application. An attacker with network access to the database instance can use this credential to bypass application authentication and gain sysadmin privileges, allowing for arbitrary operating-system command execution (typically as SYSTEM). Exploitability depends entirely on the database\u0027s network exposure."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 9.6,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-798",
"description": "CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-522",
"description": "CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-269",
"description": "CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "b2ca432d-cded-42d0-8f57-c6a1a430c957",
"shortName": "CI-ISAC"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "CI-ISAC Australia Vulnerability Disclosure Policy",
"url": "https://ci-isac.org.au/vulnerability-disclosure-policy"
},
{
"name": "Vendor release notes (Oxford SP1)",
"tags": [
"release-notes"
],
"url": "https://kb.bestpracticesoftware.com/bppremier/oxford/WhatsNew/BpPremier_OxfordSP1_ReleaseNotes.htm"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Upgrade to Bp Premier 1.14.1.1129 (Oxford SP1) or later."
}
],
"timeline": [
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-05-26T00:00:00.000Z",
"value": "Reported to CI-ISAC Australia by anonymous third party."
},
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-06-03T00:00:00.000Z",
"value": "Independently verified by CI-ISAC Australia; additional detail established."
},
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-09-25T00:00:00.000Z",
"value": "Coordinated public disclosure."
}
],
"title": "Best Practice Software Bp Premier ships a hardcoded, shared SQL Server administrative credential",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The following reduce reachability and blast radius but do not remove the vulnerability. Restrict network access to the Bp Premier SQL Server listener so it is reachable only from the Bp Premier server; do not expose the SQL Server listener to untrusted networks, remote-access paths, or the public internet; apply least privilege to the SQL Server service account where the deployment supports it; and monitor for anomalous direct SQL Server authentication and for enabling of operating-system command execution features."
}
],
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "GCVE-123-2026-0001"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "b2ca432d-cded-42d0-8f57-c6a1a430c957",
"assignerShortName": "CI-ISAC",
"datePublished": "2026-09-25T00:00:00.000Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-06-11T00:00:00.000Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T07:35:42.672Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2.0"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.