GCVE-1-2026-20158 (CVE-2026-92003)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-15 11:43 – Updated: 2026-09-15 11:43| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-09-15 11:37 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch
db6f78e69079… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
2bf887433651
|
fix: [logging] Throttle the two unguarded auth_fail writes | db6f78e69079… |
Fix summary
The fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client's source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read('CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys')) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator's log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.
Patch summary
In app/Controller/AppController.php: (1) The 'no authkey' branch in beforeFilter() now calls _shouldLog('noauthkey:' . $this->User->_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (2) The 'incorrect length' branch in __loginByAuthKey() now calls _shouldLog('badauthkeylength:' . $this->User->_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (3) _shouldLog() is refactored to first check a per-request memo array (Configure 'CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys') to suppress duplicate logging across the double beforeFilter() invocation, then evaluate the log_each_individual_auth_fail setting, then fall through to the Redis EXISTS/SETEX 3600-second throttle, and finally record the key in the memo. The Redis-unavailable fallback (log everything) is preserved.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerable paths are reachable over the network (AV:N) with no authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N). The attack complexity is low (AC:L): an attacker simply sends repeated HTTP requests to the MISP API without an API key or with a key of the wrong length. No attack target is required (AT:N). There is no impact on confidentiality (VC:N, SC:N) or integrity (VI:N, SI:N). The availability impact is high (VA:H) because unbounded log writes can exhaust database storage, degrade query performance, and ultimately make the MISP instance unavailable. No secondary availability impact (SA:N) is evident from the patch.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-770 Two authentication-failure log write paths lacked any rate-limiting or throttling mechanism, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to generate an unbounded number of database log entries and exhaust storage or I/O resources. The fix adds the missing hourly per-key throttle.
- CWE-400 The unthrottled log writes constitute uncontrolled consumption of database write capacity and disk storage, enabling a denial-of-service condition. CWE-770 is the more specific primary weakness; CWE-400 captures the broader resource-exhaustion impact.
Assumptions to verify
- The tag_version_boundary (v2.5.46, 188 commits after fix) is used as an approximate upper bound for affected versions; the exact fixed release tag is not stated in the patch metadata.
- The log entries are written to a relational database (MySQL/PostgreSQL) via MISP's Log model, based on the createLogEntry() call pattern; the specific backend is not confirmed in the patch.
- The Redis instance used for throttling is assumed to be co-located with the MISP application; a Redis outage degrades to logging everything (fail-open), which is a design choice documented in the patch comments.
- CVSS VA:H assumes that sustained unthrottled log writes can exhaust storage or I/O capacity sufficient to degrade or halt the MISP service; actual impact depends on deployment sizing and disk capacity.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 9 | medium | 4 |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"modules": [
"app/Controller/AppController.php"
],
"product": "MISP",
"programFiles": [
"app/Controller/AppController.php"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"vendor": "MISP",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.5.46",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5 (1M context)"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAffected versions of MISP do not consistently apply the existing authentication-failure logging throttle.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTwo API authentication failure branches wrote directly to the \u003ccode\u003eLog\u003c/code\u003e model:\u003c/p\u003e\u2003- API requests with \u003cstrong\u003eno authentication key\u003c/strong\u003e;\u003cbr\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u2003- requests supplying an API key with an \u003cstrong\u003eincorrect length\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eUnlike other authentication failures, these paths bypassed \u003ccode\u003e_shouldLog()\u003c/code\u003e, so every request could create another durable \u003ccode\u003eauth_fail\u003c/code\u003e entry.\u003c/p\u003eVersion affected: \u22642.5.45\u003cbr\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Affected versions of MISP do not consistently apply the existing authentication-failure logging throttle.\n\n\nTwo API authentication failure branches wrote directly to the Log model:\n\n\u2003- API requests with no authentication key;\n\u2003- requests supplying an API key with an incorrect length\n\n\n\n\nUnlike other authentication failures, these paths bypassed _shouldLog(), so every request could create another durable auth_fail entry.\n\nVersion affected: \u22642.5.45"
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-125",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-125 Flooding"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-770",
"description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-400",
"description": "CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client\u0027s source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read(\u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027)) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator\u0027s log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client\u0027s source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read(\u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027)) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator\u0027s log_each_individual_auth_fail setting."
}
],
"title": "MISP Unthrottled Authentication Failure Log Writes Enable Resource Exhaustion",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "review",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The tag_version_boundary (v2.5.46, 188 commits after fix) is used as an approximate upper bound for affected versions; the exact fixed release tag is not stated in the patch metadata.",
"The log entries are written to a relational database (MySQL/PostgreSQL) via MISP\u0027s Log model, based on the createLogEntry() call pattern; the specific backend is not confirmed in the patch.",
"The Redis instance used for throttling is assumed to be co-located with the MISP application; a Redis outage degrades to logging everything (fail-open), which is a design choice documented in the patch comments.",
"CVSS VA:H assumes that sustained unthrottled log writes can exhaust storage or I/O capacity sufficient to degrade or halt the MISP service; actual impact depends on deployment sizing and disk capacity."
],
"commit": "2bf8874336518d8c5ef6a42e51e78900ec242630",
"confidence": "medium",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5 (1M context)"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "The vulnerable paths are reachable over the network (AV:N) with no authentication (PR:N) and no user interaction (UI:N). The attack complexity is low (AC:L): an attacker simply sends repeated HTTP requests to the MISP API without an API key or with a key of the wrong length. No attack target is required (AT:N). There is no impact on confidentiality (VC:N, SC:N) or integrity (VI:N, SI:N). The availability impact is high (VA:H) because unbounded log writes can exhaust database storage, degrade query performance, and ultimately make the MISP instance unavailable. No secondary availability impact (SA:N) is evident from the patch.",
"draft": false,
"fixSummary": "The fix applies the existing hourly per-key log throttle to the two previously unguarded authentication-failure log writes. The throttle key is now derived from the client\u0027s source IP address rather than from caller-supplied input, preventing an attacker from generating unbounded Redis throttle entries. A per-request memo (stored in Configure::read(\u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027)) is added to _shouldLog() to prevent duplicate log entries when beforeFilter() executes a second time via CakeErrorController on an exception, ensuring one request produces at most one log entry per key regardless of the operator\u0027s log_each_individual_auth_fail setting.",
"generatedAt": "2026-09-15T11:37:41.625192Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 9,
"assumptionCount": 4,
"confidence": "medium",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 6
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "db6f78e69079c91d4ba1dac46c4ed5b8ff1ca617c00cd6733bff926c0925a2e3",
"patchSummary": "In app/Controller/AppController.php: (1) The \u0027no authkey\u0027 branch in beforeFilter() now calls _shouldLog(\u0027noauthkey:\u0027 . $this-\u003eUser-\u003e_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (2) The \u0027incorrect length\u0027 branch in __loginByAuthKey() now calls _shouldLog(\u0027badauthkeylength:\u0027 . $this-\u003eUser-\u003e_remoteIp()) before writing the log entry. (3) _shouldLog() is refactored to first check a per-request memo array (Configure \u0027CurrentRequestAuthFailKeys\u0027) to suppress duplicate logging across the double beforeFilter() invocation, then evaluate the log_each_individual_auth_fail setting, then fall through to the Redis EXISTS/SETEX 3600-second throttle, and finally record the key in the memo. The Redis-unavailable fallback (log everything) is preserved.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "2bf8874336518d8c5ef6a42e51e78900ec242630",
"patchSha256": "db6f78e69079c91d4ba1dac46c4ed5b8ff1ca617c00cd6733bff926c0925a2e3",
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch",
"subject": "fix: [logging] Throttle the two unguarded auth_fail writes"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2bf887433.patch",
"subject": "fix: [logging] Throttle the two unguarded auth_fail writes",
"tagVersionBoundary": {
"commits_after_fix": 188,
"repository": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"tag": "v2.5.46",
"version": "2.5.46",
"version_type": "semver"
},
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-770",
"rationale": "Two authentication-failure log write paths lacked any rate-limiting or throttling mechanism, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to generate an unbounded number of database log entries and exhaust storage or I/O resources. The fix adds the missing hourly per-key throttle."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-400",
"rationale": "The unthrottled log writes constitute uncontrolled consumption of database write capacity and disk storage, enabling a denial-of-service condition. CWE-770 is the more specific primary weakness; CWE-400 captures the broader resource-exhaustion impact."
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20158"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-92003",
"datePublished": "2026-09-15T11:43:10.471950Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-15T11:43:17.522Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-15T11:43:17.611571Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20158"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1"
}
Solutions
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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