FKIE_CVE-2026-9728
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-24 15:16 - Updated: 2026-08-26 16:59
Severity
Summary
The userspace syscall verifier z_vrfy_mbox_send() in drivers/mbox/mbox_handlers.c validated the nested msg->data/msg->size fields by reading them directly out of live userspace memory, and then forwarded the original, still-mutable userspace struct mbox_msg * pointer to z_impl_mbox_send() and the underlying driver. Between the access check and the driver's use of msg->data, the validated pointer could be replaced, leaving a time-of-check/time-of-use window.
On a system built with CONFIG_USERSPACE, any unprivileged userspace thread may invoke the mbox_send() system call. A second thread sharing the caller's address space can race to overwrite msg->data with a supervisor (kernel) address after the verifier's bounds check has passed but before the driver dereferences it. The driver then reads from the attacker-chosen address in supervisor context (for example memcpy(&data32, msg->data, msg->size) in the NXP mailbox driver, whose bytes are subsequently emitted to the peer mailbox endpoint).
The impact is a userspace-to-supervisor access-control bypass: disclosure of kernel memory contents (high confidentiality impact), or, for an invalid/unmapped target address, a faulting kernel read causing denial of service. The fix snapshots the entire struct mbox_msg into a kernel-stack copy with k_usermode_from_copy() and validates and forwards that immutable copy, closing the race.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"product": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/mbox/mbox_handlers.c"
],
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.4.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The userspace syscall verifier z_vrfy_mbox_send() in drivers/mbox/mbox_handlers.c validated the nested msg-\u003edata/msg-\u003esize fields by reading them directly out of live userspace memory, and then forwarded the original, still-mutable userspace struct mbox_msg * pointer to z_impl_mbox_send() and the underlying driver. Between the access check and the driver\u0027s use of msg-\u003edata, the validated pointer could be replaced, leaving a time-of-check/time-of-use window.\n\nOn a system built with CONFIG_USERSPACE, any unprivileged userspace thread may invoke the mbox_send() system call. A second thread sharing the caller\u0027s address space can race to overwrite msg-\u003edata with a supervisor (kernel) address after the verifier\u0027s bounds check has passed but before the driver dereferences it. The driver then reads from the attacker-chosen address in supervisor context (for example memcpy(\u0026data32, msg-\u003edata, msg-\u003esize) in the NXP mailbox driver, whose bytes are subsequently emitted to the peer mailbox endpoint).\n\nThe impact is a userspace-to-supervisor access-control bypass: disclosure of kernel memory contents (high confidentiality impact), or, for an invalid/unmapped target address, a faulting kernel read causing denial of service. The fix snapshots the entire struct mbox_msg into a kernel-stack copy with k_usermode_from_copy() and validates and forwards that immutable copy, closing the race."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-9728",
"lastModified": "2026-08-26T16:59:23.267",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 6.4,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.1,
"impactScore": 4.7,
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-9728",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-25T19:06:27.362976Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-24T15:16:49.010",
"references": [
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/ab35eaccec5976f05c196f176d0c32885754496f"
},
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-47q2-w832-7w67"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-367"
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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