FKIE_CVE-2026-87044

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-04 06:17 - Updated: 2026-11-04 06:17
Summary
The Mbed TLS crypto shim driver in drivers/crypto/crypto_mbedtls_shim.c drives PSA multipart cipher and AEAD operations. In mbedtls_cbc() and mbedtls_aead(), every error path after a successful psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() / psa_aead_decrypt_setup() returned directly without calling psa_cipher_abort() / psa_aead_abort(). Because the abort is the only thing that reaches mbedtls_cipher_free(), each failed operation permanently leaked the heap-allocated mbedtls_aes_context (roughly 288 bytes) that setup had allocated from Mbed TLS's fixed static heap (_mbedtls_heap[CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HEAP_SIZE], default 512 bytes). With CONFIG_PSA_CRYPTO_PROVIDER_TFM the leaked object is instead a finite secure-partition multipart-operation slot. The failure is chosen by an unauthenticated attacker. With CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_SECURITY backed by this driver, ieee802154_decrypt_auth() in subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_security.c invokes cipher_ccm_op() on every received secured frame, with no authentication ahead of the MIC check. A device in radio range can transmit a stream of syntactically valid 802.15.4 frames carrying a bogus MIC; each one makes psa_aead_verify() fail and leaks a block. The CBC path is reachable the same way through the OSDP secure channel, where CONFIG_OSDP_SC_ENABLED selects this shim and osdp_encrypt() / osdp_decrypt() leave out_buf_max unset, so every operation fails inside psa_cipher_update(). Exhausting the Mbed TLS heap — which the default configuration reaches after a couple of failed operations, and any realistic configuration reaches in well under a second of frames — makes all subsequent mbedtls_calloc() calls fail. Every later cryptographic operation in the image then fails permanently, including link-layer security and any TLS/DTLS sharing the same heap, until the device is rebooted. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure: frames with an invalid MIC are still rejected, so the impact is limited to availability. The fix routes all post-setup failures in mbedtls_cbc() and mbedtls_aead() through a common error: label that calls the matching PSA abort before returning. Setup failures need no change, since the PSA core aborts the operation itself when setup fails.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/crypto/crypto_mbedtls_shim.c"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "mbedtls_aead"
            },
            {
              "name": "mbedtls_cbc"
            }
          ],
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.5.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.4.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Mbed TLS crypto shim driver in drivers/crypto/crypto_mbedtls_shim.c drives PSA multipart cipher and AEAD operations. In mbedtls_cbc() and mbedtls_aead(), every error path after a successful psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() / psa_aead_decrypt_setup() returned directly without calling psa_cipher_abort() / psa_aead_abort(). Because the abort is the only thing that reaches mbedtls_cipher_free(), each failed operation permanently leaked the heap-allocated mbedtls_aes_context (roughly 288 bytes) that setup had allocated from Mbed TLS\u0027s fixed static heap (_mbedtls_heap[CONFIG_MBEDTLS_HEAP_SIZE], default 512 bytes). With CONFIG_PSA_CRYPTO_PROVIDER_TFM the leaked object is instead a finite secure-partition multipart-operation slot.\n\nThe failure is chosen by an unauthenticated attacker. With CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_SECURITY backed by this driver, ieee802154_decrypt_auth() in subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_security.c invokes cipher_ccm_op() on every received secured frame, with no authentication ahead of the MIC check. A device in radio range can transmit a stream of syntactically valid 802.15.4 frames carrying a bogus MIC; each one makes psa_aead_verify() fail and leaks a block. The CBC path is reachable the same way through the OSDP secure channel, where CONFIG_OSDP_SC_ENABLED selects this shim and osdp_encrypt() / osdp_decrypt() leave out_buf_max unset, so every operation fails inside psa_cipher_update().\n\nExhausting the Mbed TLS heap \u2014 which the default configuration reaches after a couple of failed operations, and any realistic configuration reaches in well under a second of frames \u2014 makes all subsequent mbedtls_calloc() calls fail. Every later cryptographic operation in the image then fails permanently, including link-layer security and any TLS/DTLS sharing the same heap, until the device is rebooted. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure: frames with an invalid MIC are still rejected, so the impact is limited to availability.\n\nThe fix routes all post-setup failures in mbedtls_cbc() and mbedtls_aead() through a common error: label that calls the matching PSA abort before returning. Setup failures need no change, since the PSA core aborts the operation itself when setup fails."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-87044",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-04T06:17:07.460",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-11-04T06:17:07.313",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/8e7e9e9bf9f0b1a7acd12ef3d6d38473b1ce6d43"
    },
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-r8x3-637f-c986"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-401"
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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