FKIE_CVE-2026-8457
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-02 00:16 - Updated: 2026-10-23 22:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "WooCommerce - Social Login",
"vendor": "WPWeb",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "2.8.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The WooCommerce - Social Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to and including 2.8.7. This is due to the plugin\u0027s Apple login handler accepting the Apple id_token and decoding only its base64 payload without verifying the JWT signature against Apple\u0027s public keys or validating the issuer, audience, or expiry claims, combined with the security nonce required to invoke the login flow being publicly exposed to unauthenticated users via a localized JavaScript object on the login page. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing WordPress user \u2014 including administrators \u2014 by supplying a forged id_token whose payload contains the target user\u0027s email address, as that email is used without any role exclusion to resolve a WordPress account and immediately issue an authenticated session for it."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El plugin WooCommerce - Social Login para WordPress es vulnerable a omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n en todas las versiones hasta la 2.8.7 inclusive. Esto se debe a que el gestor de inicio de sesi\u00f3n de Apple del plugin acepta el id_token de Apple y decodifica solo su carga \u00fatil base64 sin verificar la firma JWT contra las claves p\u00fablicas de Apple ni validar las reclamaciones de emisor, audiencia o caducidad, combinado con el nonce de seguridad requerido para invocar el flujo de inicio de sesi\u00f3n que est\u00e1 expuesto p\u00fablicamente a usuarios no autenticados a trav\u00e9s de un objeto JavaScript localizado en la p\u00e1gina de inicio de sesi\u00f3n. Esto hace posible que atacantes no autenticados inicien sesi\u00f3n como cualquier usuario existente de WordPress - incluidos los administradores - al proporcionar un id_token falsificado cuya carga \u00fatil contiene la direcci\u00f3n de correo electr\u00f3nico del usuario objetivo, ya que ese correo electr\u00f3nico se utiliza sin exclusi\u00f3n de rol alguna para resolver una cuenta de WordPress y emitir inmediatamente una sesi\u00f3n autenticada para ella."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-8457",
"lastModified": "2026-10-23T22:10:00.160",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-8457",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-03T18:55:32.670795Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-02T00:16:23.047",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://codecanyon.net/item/social-login-wordpress-woocommerce-plugin/8495883"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/53e83037-2cc5-4dc9-b55d-03829df12a65?source=cve"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-289"
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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