FKIE_CVE-2026-8356
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-15 18:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 23:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "LibreOffice",
"vendor": "The Document Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "\u003c 26.2.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "26.2",
"versionType": "26.2 series"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@documentfoundation.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "LibreOffice can import presentations in the legacy binary PPT format. A stack buffer overflow existed when importing a colour-replacement record. Two fixed-size colour tables were filled from the file, but the write position was not reset between the two passes over the record, so a file whose combined colour counts exceeded the table size wrote past the end of the tables on the stack. In fixed versions the unused second pass is no longer read into those tables."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "LibreOffice puede importar presentaciones en el formato binario PPT heredado. Exist\u00eda un desbordamiento de b\u00fafer en la pila al importar un registro de reemplazo de color. Dos tablas de color de tama\u00f1o fijo se llenaban desde el archivo, pero la posici\u00f3n de escritura no se restablec\u00eda entre las dos pasadas sobre el registro, por lo que un archivo cuyas cuentas de color combinadas exced\u00edan el tama\u00f1o de la tabla escrib\u00eda m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del final de las tablas en la pila. En versiones corregidas, la segunda pasada no utilizada ya no se lee en esas tablas."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-8356",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T23:10:00.167",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 5.4,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "PROOF_OF_CONCEPT",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security@documentfoundation.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-8356",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-15T18:04:56.736672Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-15T18:16:37.390",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@documentfoundation.org",
"url": "https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/security/advisories/cve-2026-8356"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@documentfoundation.org",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-121"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-787"
}
],
"source": "security@documentfoundation.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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