FKIE_CVE-2026-75804
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-29 16:17 - Updated: 2026-09-29 21:27
Severity
Summary
Issue summary: OpenSSL QUIC stack does not enforce connection
level flow control for streams. Remote peers may send more bytes
as long as they fit within the stream flow control limits.
Impact summary: A malicious remote peer may exploit the lack of connection
flow control for streams to make the QUIC stack receive ~100MB of memory
instead of 768 KiB (default flow control window size).
CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Description: The local QUIC stack advertises two flow control limits
to its remote peer: stream flow control limit and connection flow
control limit. The remote peer must follow both limits when transmitting
stream data.
Whenever the local QUIC stack receives a stream frame, it validates
that the size of the received stream frame stays within flow control limits.
If either limit is exceeded (stream level or connection level), then
the QUIC stack must close the connection with a flow control error.
The vulnerable OpenSSL QUIC stack enforces the stream-level but not
the connection-level limit. To exploit the issue, three conditions must be met:
- the remote peer opens several streams
- each stream must stay within the stream-level flow control limit
- there must be no zero-offset byte sent on any of the streams
(to prevent the vulnerable QUIC stack from consuming data).
By meeting the conditions above, the remote peer may make the local stack
allocate 2 x MAX_STREAMS x (stream flow control limit) bytes
of memory. MAX_STREAMS defaults to 100, and the limit applies to both
bidirectional and unidirectional streams, making it 200 in total. The default
flow control window for a stream is 512kB. The remote peer may
force the vulnerable QUIC stack to allocate 100MB of heap per connection.
FIPS impact: no
The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of
the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": "OpenSSL",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.0.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.6.5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.6.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.5.9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.5.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.4.8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.4.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Issue summary: OpenSSL QUIC stack does not enforce connection\nlevel flow control for streams. Remote peers may send more bytes\nas long as they fit within the stream flow control limits.\n\nImpact summary: A malicious remote peer may exploit the lack of connection\nflow control for streams to make the QUIC stack receive ~100MB of memory\ninstead of 768 KiB (default flow control window size).\n\nCWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\nDescription: The local QUIC stack advertises two flow control limits\nto its remote peer: stream flow control limit and connection flow\ncontrol limit. The remote peer must follow both limits when transmitting\nstream data.\n\nWhenever the local QUIC stack receives a stream frame, it validates\nthat the size of the received stream frame stays within flow control limits.\nIf either limit is exceeded (stream level or connection level), then\nthe QUIC stack must close the connection with a flow control error.\n\nThe vulnerable OpenSSL QUIC stack enforces the stream-level but not\nthe connection-level limit. To exploit the issue, three conditions must be met:\n - the remote peer opens several streams\n - each stream must stay within the stream-level flow control limit\n - there must be no zero-offset byte sent on any of the streams\n (to prevent the vulnerable QUIC stack from consuming data).\nBy meeting the conditions above, the remote peer may make the local stack\nallocate 2 x MAX_STREAMS x (stream flow control limit) bytes\nof memory. MAX_STREAMS defaults to 100, and the limit applies to both\nbidirectional and unidirectional streams, making it 200 in total. The default\nflow control window for a stream is 512kB. The remote peer may\nforce the vulnerable QUIC stack to allocate 100MB of heap per connection.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of\nthe OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-75804",
"lastModified": "2026-09-29T21:27:41.130",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-75804",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-29T17:15:09.218928Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-29T16:17:10.887",
"references": [
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2e8f54666b3fb7b05ff5f58aa6cac9285163654e"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4533ee8a5686c953ed3b644738ac4bdf20806538"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/64d3102fb5b54311e92517f26ba00169d719e74a"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f9eaecf5bdd6692da052bc65b0332af2a938ac03"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260929.txt"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-770"
}
],
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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