FKIE_CVE-2026-74500
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 13:17 - Updated: 2026-08-17 06:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix stack info leak in RME Digiface status
snd_rme_digiface_read_status() reads a four-word status block from the
device into an uninitialised on-stack __le32 buf[4] and, whenever the
vendor control-IN transfer does not return a negative error, copies all
four words into the caller's status[].
snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full requested size back into the caller's
buffer regardless of how many bytes the data stage actually delivered:
buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = usb_control_msg(dev, pipe, request, requesttype,
value, index, buf, size, timeout);
memcpy(data, buf, size);
usb_control_msg() returns the transferred length on a short control-IN,
which is a non-negative value, and writes only that many bytes. The
remainder of the copy back is the kmemdup()ed image of the caller's
buffer, so a device answering with a short data stage leaves the
trailing words of buf[] holding leftover kernel stack. The only guard
in the caller is err < 0, so those words are stored into status[].
They then reach user space: snd_rme_digiface_get_status_val() selects a
16-bit halfword of status[] per the control's reg/mask, and the eight
Digiface status controls together expose the whole 16-byte frame to an
unprivileged reader of /dev/snd/controlC*.
Zero-initialise the buffer so a short read yields zeros instead of stack
residue. This mirrors snd_rme_get_status1(), which already clears its
output word before the same kind of vendor read.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b3a346d5c99dd73cf84711f2a43e42691990efd2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "611a96f6acf2e74fe28cb90908a9c183862348ce",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7ba01e0d3539d9cf0aef3e82938f1648147744cc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "611a96f6acf2e74fe28cb90908a9c183862348ce",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "98dbfbb38e297c25c5b0af4a9018d71ac25e8554",
"status": "affected",
"version": "611a96f6acf2e74fe28cb90908a9c183862348ce",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "441aaad150c57edaf57ee482a79a3bf4c5b7e353",
"status": "affected",
"version": "611a96f6acf2e74fe28cb90908a9c183862348ce",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3089703ab71484a8b9a7641051181d11d60f870c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "50f63f11a6ddaa0d34574df72b3fa6ee257c057d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.10.14",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.12",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.11.3",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.103",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.44",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: usb-audio: fix stack info leak in RME Digiface status\n\nsnd_rme_digiface_read_status() reads a four-word status block from the\ndevice into an uninitialised on-stack __le32 buf[4] and, whenever the\nvendor control-IN transfer does not return a negative error, copies all\nfour words into the caller\u0027s status[].\n\nsnd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full requested size back into the caller\u0027s\nbuffer regardless of how many bytes the data stage actually delivered:\n\n\tbuf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL);\n\terr = usb_control_msg(dev, pipe, request, requesttype,\n\t\t\t value, index, buf, size, timeout);\n\tmemcpy(data, buf, size);\n\nusb_control_msg() returns the transferred length on a short control-IN,\nwhich is a non-negative value, and writes only that many bytes. The\nremainder of the copy back is the kmemdup()ed image of the caller\u0027s\nbuffer, so a device answering with a short data stage leaves the\ntrailing words of buf[] holding leftover kernel stack. The only guard\nin the caller is err \u003c 0, so those words are stored into status[].\n\nThey then reach user space: snd_rme_digiface_get_status_val() selects a\n16-bit halfword of status[] per the control\u0027s reg/mask, and the eight\nDigiface status controls together expose the whole 16-byte frame to an\nunprivileged reader of /dev/snd/controlC*.\n\nZero-initialise the buffer so a short read yields zeros instead of stack\nresidue. This mirrors snd_rme_get_status1(), which already clears its\noutput word before the same kind of vendor read.\n\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee \u003cbaul.lee@xbow.com\u003e"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-74500",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:19:46.447",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-15T13:17:54.970",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/441aaad150c57edaf57ee482a79a3bf4c5b7e353"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ba01e0d3539d9cf0aef3e82938f1648147744cc"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98dbfbb38e297c25c5b0af4a9018d71ac25e8554"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3a346d5c99dd73cf84711f2a43e42691990efd2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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