FKIE_CVE-2026-64567
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-05 08:16 - Updated: 2026-11-03 18:15| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "8ded74c654a982dc8581a17b0caa7fcedb20de69",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5b0e95bf607ddd59b39f52d3d55e6581c817b530",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c9c38066b6446e83668c041702bb639b0ca49363",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5b0e95bf607ddd59b39f52d3d55e6581c817b530",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "094734c7aaa2b36751dc32480a680a4952685e78",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5b0e95bf607ddd59b39f52d3d55e6581c817b530",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "33878ba25e2638bc0c61623d7a05c9ca2b74c039",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5b0e95bf607ddd59b39f52d3d55e6581c817b530",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "404a0b986e0b6e79738fdf1f0ebbbc43b9acd2a2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5b0e95bf607ddd59b39f52d3d55e6581c817b530",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5e1b2ca6b34939e70fb0785e8222b53cf060016f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5b0e95bf607ddd59b39f52d3d55e6581c817b530",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f9fef131fa3f59b857217f522fa5ea430d1b707c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5b0e95bf607ddd59b39f52d3d55e6581c817b530",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a2d8d5647ed854e38f941741aea45b9eb15a6350",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5b0e95bf607ddd59b39f52d3d55e6581c817b530",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.265",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.216",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.183",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.148",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages\n\nWhen loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes\nnum_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk\nbtrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key\nwith type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is\nvalidated before the load trusts it.\n\nThe load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current\none runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -\u003e io_ctl_map_page(), which\ndoes io_ctl-\u003epages[io_ctl-\u003eindex++]. But pages[] is allocated in\nio_ctl_init() from the cache inode\u0027s i_size, not from num_entries:\n\n\tnum_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE);\n\tio_ctl-\u003epages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);\n\nSo if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl-\u003eindex\nruns off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because\nio_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once\nio_ctl-\u003eindex \u003e= io_ctl-\u003enum_pages; the read side just never had the same\ncheck.\n\nTo trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = \u003cN\u003e here), set num_entries\nin the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes\nthe tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and\npages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read\n65536 entries, io_ctl-\u003eindex walks up to 16, and pages[16] is read past the\narray:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800c833a80 by task kworker/u8:3/58\n io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565)\n __load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:655 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:820)\n load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:1017)\n caching_thread (fs/btrfs/block-group.c:880)\n btrfs_work_helper (fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:312)\n process_one_work\n worker_thread\n kthread\n ret_from_fork\n\nfree-space-cache.c:420 is io_ctl_map_page(), inlined into io_ctl_check_crc()\nat line 565, which is why that is the frame KASAN names. The out-of-bounds\nslot is then treated as a struct page and handed to crc32c(), so the bad\nread turns into a GP fault.\n\nAdd the missing check to io_ctl_check_crc(), which is where both the entry\nloop and the bitmap loop end up. When num_entries is too large the load now\nfails like any corrupt cache: __load_free_space_cache() drops it and rebuilds\nthe free space from the extent tree, so a valid cache is never rejected."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-64567",
"lastModified": "2026-11-03T18:15:39.353",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-64567",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-16T15:42:59.944567Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-05T08:16:36.277",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/094734c7aaa2b36751dc32480a680a4952685e78"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33878ba25e2638bc0c61623d7a05c9ca2b74c039"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/404a0b986e0b6e79738fdf1f0ebbbc43b9acd2a2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e1b2ca6b34939e70fb0785e8222b53cf060016f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ded74c654a982dc8581a17b0caa7fcedb20de69"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2d8d5647ed854e38f941741aea45b9eb15a6350"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9c38066b6446e83668c041702bb639b0ca49363"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f9fef131fa3f59b857217f522fa5ea430d1b707c"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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