FKIE_CVE-2026-62331

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-30 19:18 - Updated: 2026-10-30 20:17
Severity
8.2 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Summary
praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c3731eeda01c0b3ec1dbd13cccd5a147c3182141
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/tag/v0.9.1
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "praktor",
          "vendor": "mtzanidakis",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.9.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-62331",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-30T20:17:12.210",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-62331",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-30T19:45:09.898798Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-30T19:18:33.450",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c3731eeda01c0b3ec1dbd13cccd5a147c3182141"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/tag/v0.9.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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