FKIE_CVE-2026-59675

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-05 08:16 - Updated: 2026-10-24 16:10
Severity
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
When API audit logging is enabled, the middleware reads the entire HTTP request body into memory without enforcing a size limit on login endpoints. Because the audit middleware is positioned earlier in the handler chain than Rancher's APIBodyLimitingHandler, the body-size cap (default 1 MiB) is bypassed for requests that pass through the audit copyReqBody path. An unauthenticated attacker can send arbitrarily large request bodies to the public login endpoints, causing the Rancher Manager server process to allocate memory proportional to the supplied body size. With just a few concurrent connections, this can exhaust available memory and terminate the Rancher Manager plane process, making the Rancher API and UI unavailable and interrupting management of all downstream clusters.
References
meissner@suse.dehttps://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2026-59675
meissner@suse.dehttps://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-g4f6-44g4-23xm
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "Rancher",
          "product": "Rancher",
          "vendor": "SUSE",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.14.4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.14.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.13.8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.13.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.12.12",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.12.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "meissner@suse.de"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "When API audit logging is enabled, the middleware reads the entire HTTP request body into memory without enforcing a size limit on login endpoints. Because the audit middleware is positioned earlier in the handler chain than Rancher\u0027s APIBodyLimitingHandler, the body-size cap (default 1 MiB) is bypassed for requests that pass through the audit copyReqBody path. An unauthenticated attacker can send arbitrarily large request bodies to the public login endpoints, causing the Rancher Manager server process to allocate memory proportional to the supplied body size. With just a few concurrent connections, this can exhaust available memory and terminate the Rancher Manager plane process, making the Rancher API and UI unavailable and interrupting management of all downstream clusters."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Cuando el registro de auditor\u00eda de la API est\u00e1 habilitado, el middleware lee el cuerpo completo de la solicitud HTTP en la memoria sin aplicar un l\u00edmite de tama\u00f1o en los puntos finales de inicio de sesi\u00f3n. Debido a que el middleware de auditor\u00eda est\u00e1 posicionado antes en la cadena de gestores que el APIBodyLimitingHandler de Rancher, el l\u00edmite de tama\u00f1o del cuerpo (predeterminado 1 MiB) se omite para las solicitudes que pasan por la ruta de auditor\u00eda copyReqBody. Un atacante no autenticado puede enviar cuerpos de solicitud arbitrariamente grandes a los puntos finales de inicio de sesi\u00f3n p\u00fablicos, haciendo que el proceso del servidor de Rancher Manager asigne memoria proporcional al tama\u00f1o del cuerpo suministrado. Con solo unas pocas conexiones concurrentes, esto puede agotar la memoria disponible y terminar el proceso del plano de Rancher Manager, dejando la API y la UI de Rancher no disponibles e interrumpiendo la gesti\u00f3n de todos los cl\u00fasteres descendentes."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-59675",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T16:10:00.153",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "meissner@suse.de",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-59675",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-05T13:14:41.312459Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-05T08:16:34.593",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "meissner@suse.de",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2026-59675"
    },
    {
      "source": "meissner@suse.de",
      "url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-g4f6-44g4-23xm"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "meissner@suse.de",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-770"
        }
      ],
      "source": "meissner@suse.de",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.