FKIE_CVE-2026-59179

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-28 14:17 - Updated: 2026-11-04 23:10
Summary
OpenHop is a tool for creating interactive data-flow diagrams. Prior to 0.3.7, `@openhop/server` passes unauthenticated flow route parameters from `GET /api/flows/:id` and `DELETE /api/flows/:id` in `packages/server/src/routes.ts` to `FlowStore.filePath()` in `packages/server/src/store.ts` without an identifier allow-list. The router applies `decodeURIComponent` to the id, and `path.join()` then normalizes traversal outside the configured flow directory after appending the .yaml extension. An attacker can read accessible YAML files as YAML-parsed JSON or permanently delete accessible .yaml files outside that directory, exposing configuration or secrets and disrupting dependent services. In `packages/server/src/index.ts`, CORS `origin: true` permits any browser origin, enabling a malicious webpage to target a loopback-bound instance. Docker deployments default to `HOST=0.0.0.0` and permit direct unauthenticated network access. This issue is fixed in repository release 0.3.7.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "openhop",
          "vendor": "naorsabag",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.3.7"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OpenHop is a tool for creating interactive data-flow diagrams. Prior to 0.3.7, `@openhop/server` passes unauthenticated flow route parameters from `GET /api/flows/:id` and `DELETE /api/flows/:id` in `packages/server/src/routes.ts` to `FlowStore.filePath()` in `packages/server/src/store.ts` without an identifier allow-list. The router applies `decodeURIComponent` to the id, and `path.join()` then normalizes traversal outside the configured flow directory after appending the .yaml extension. An attacker can read accessible YAML files as YAML-parsed JSON or permanently delete accessible .yaml files outside that directory, exposing configuration or secrets and disrupting dependent services. In `packages/server/src/index.ts`, CORS `origin: true` permits any browser origin, enabling a malicious webpage to target a loopback-bound instance. Docker deployments default to `HOST=0.0.0.0` and permit direct unauthenticated network access. This issue is fixed in repository release 0.3.7."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "OpenHop es una herramienta para crear diagramas de flujo de datos interactivos. Versiones anteriores a la 0.3.7, \u201c@openhop/server\u201d pasa par\u00e1metros de ruta de flujo no autenticados de \u201cGET /api/flows/:id\u201d y \u201cDELETE /api/flows/:id\u201d en \u201cpackages/server/src/routes.ts\u201d a \u201cFlowStore.filePath()\u201d en \u201cpackages/server/src/store.ts\u201d sin una lista de permitidos de identificadores. El router aplica \u201cdecodeURIComponent\u201d al ID, y \u201cpath.join()\u201d luego normaliza el recorrido fuera del directorio de flujo configurado despu\u00e9s de a\u00f1adir la extensi\u00f3n .yaml. Un atacante puede leer archivos YAML accesibles como JSON parseado de YAML o eliminar permanentemente archivos .yaml accesibles fuera de ese directorio, exponiendo configuraciones o secretos e interrumpiendo servicios dependientes. En \u201cpackages/server/src/index.ts\u201d, CORS \u201corigin: true\u201d permite cualquier origen de navegador, lo que permite a una p\u00e1gina web maliciosa atacar una instancia vinculada a loopback. Las implementaciones de Docker por defecto usan \u201cHOST=0.0.0.0\u201d y permiten acceso de red directo no autenticado. Este problema se ha corregido en la versi\u00f3n 0.3.7 del repositorio."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-59179",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-04T23:10:00.223",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.3,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.5,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-59179",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-29T18:33:12.643459Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-28T14:17:04.907",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/naorsabag/openhop/commit/c8190fbefa3a50e7b0c16c001d2e05b0e920cfb4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/naorsabag/openhop/pull/190"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/naorsabag/openhop/releases/tag/v0.3.7"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/naorsabag/openhop/security/advisories/GHSA-g72f-jw3w-mgh7"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/naorsabag/openhop/security/advisories/GHSA-g72f-jw3w-mgh7"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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