FKIE_CVE-2026-59139
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-21 19:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 19:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "Data-ReqRep-Shared",
"product": "Data::ReqRep::Shared",
"programFiles": [
"reqrep.h"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "reqrep_recv_locked"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/vividsnow/perl5-data-reqrep-shared",
"vendor": "EGOR",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.05",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Data::ReqRep::Shared versions before 0.05 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via an unvalidated arena offset and length in reqrep_recv_locked.\n\nThe attach-time validator reqrep_validate_header checks the header scalars and region layout against the file size, but does not validate the array contents it then trusts. reqrep_recv_locked does memcpy(copy_buf, req_arena + arena_off, len) with arena_off and len read raw from the mmap\u0027d segment and never bounded against the arena capacity (req_arena_cap).\n\nA local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while poisoning a request slot\u0027s offset and length, so receiving the request copies a file-controlled offset and length out of the arena, reading adjacent memory or crashing the process."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Las versiones de Data::ReqRep::Shared anteriores a 0.05 para Perl permiten una lectura fuera de l\u00edmites a trav\u00e9s de un desplazamiento y una longitud de arena no validados en reqrep_recv_locked.\n\nEl validador en tiempo de adjunci\u00f3n reqrep_validate_header comprueba los escalares del encabezado y la disposici\u00f3n de la regi\u00f3n contra el tama\u00f1o del archivo, pero no valida el contenido del array en el que luego conf\u00eda. reqrep_recv_locked realiza memcpy(copy_buf, req_arena + arena_off, len) con arena_off y len le\u00eddos directamente del segmento mapeado en memoria y nunca acotados contra la capacidad de la arena (req_arena_cap).\n\nUn par local que puede escribir el archivo de respaldo puede dejar el encabezado v\u00e1lido mientras envenena el desplazamiento y la longitud de una ranura de solicitud, de modo que recibir la solicitud copia un desplazamiento y una longitud controlados por el archivo fuera de la arena, leyendo memoria adyacente o bloqueando el proceso."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-59139",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T19:10:00.127",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-59139",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-22T19:16:20.997158Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-21T19:17:11.467",
"references": [
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EGOR/Data-ReqRep-Shared-0.05/changes"
},
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EGOR/Data-ReqRep-Shared-0.05/diff/EGOR/Data-ReqRep-Shared-0.04#reqrep.h"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
}
],
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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