FKIE_CVE-2026-56269

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-24 13:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 23:10
Severity
4.6 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Summary
Flowise before 3.1.0 (npm package flowise, versions 3.0.13 and earlier) uses a weak hardcoded default value 'Secre$t' for the TOKEN_HASH_SECRET environment variable in packages/server/src/enterprise/utils/tempTokenUtils.ts when the variable is not configured. This secret derives the AES-256-CBC key used to encrypt user IDs and workspace IDs in the 'meta' field of JWT tokens. An attacker who knows the default secret can decrypt this metadata to extract internal user and workspace identifiers, and re-encrypt manipulated values such as altered user or workspace IDs. Because the JWT signature is validated separately, decrypting or tampering with this metadata does not by itself grant access, but the disclosure of internal identifiers and possible metadata manipulation could aid privilege escalation or unauthorized data access.
References
disclosure@vulncheck.comhttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-m7mq-85xj-9x33Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
disclosure@vulncheck.comhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flowise-weak-default-token-hash-secret-in-jwt-token-encryptionThird Party Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowiseai flowise *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageURL": "pkg:npm/flowise",
          "product": "Flowise",
          "vendor": "Flowise",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "3.1.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "3.1.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:flowiseai:flowise:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "CB30DB8F-4F72-4FD3-90FB-8331F1CBB78E",
              "versionEndExcluding": "3.1.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Flowise before 3.1.0 (npm package flowise, versions 3.0.13 and earlier) uses a weak hardcoded default value \u0027Secre$t\u0027 for the TOKEN_HASH_SECRET environment variable in packages/server/src/enterprise/utils/tempTokenUtils.ts when the variable is not configured. This secret derives the AES-256-CBC key used to encrypt user IDs and workspace IDs in the \u0027meta\u0027 field of JWT tokens. An attacker who knows the default secret can decrypt this metadata to extract internal user and workspace identifiers, and re-encrypt manipulated values such as altered user or workspace IDs. Because the JWT signature is validated separately, decrypting or tampering with this metadata does not by itself grant access, but the disclosure of internal identifiers and possible metadata manipulation could aid privilege escalation or unauthorized data access."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Flowise anterior a 3.1.0 (paquete npm flowise, versiones 3.0.13 y anteriores) utiliza un valor predeterminado d\u00e9bil codificado de forma r\u00edgida \u2019Secre$t\u2019 para la variable de entorno TOKEN_HASH_SECRET en packages/server/src/enterprise/utils/tempTokenUtils.ts cuando la variable no est\u00e1 configurada. Este secreto deriva la clave AES-256-CBC utilizada para cifrar ID de usuario e ID de espacio de trabajo en el campo \u2019meta\u2019 de los tokens JWT. Un atacante que conoce el secreto predeterminado puede descifrar estos metadatos para extraer identificadores internos de usuario y de espacio de trabajo, y volver a cifrar valores manipulados como ID de usuario o de espacio de trabajo alterados. Debido a que la firma JWT se valida por separado, descifrar o manipular estos metadatos no otorga acceso por s\u00ed mismo, pero la divulgaci\u00f3n de identificadores internos y la posible manipulaci\u00f3n de metadatos podr\u00eda facilitar la escalada de privilegios o el acceso no autorizado a datos."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-56269",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-25T23:10:00.167",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.6,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 0.3,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-56269",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-06-24T14:58:08.791171Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-24T13:16:35.400",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-m7mq-85xj-9x33"
    },
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "tags": [
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flowise-weak-default-token-hash-secret-in-jwt-token-encryption"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-798"
        }
      ],
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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