FKIE_CVE-2026-54910

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-20 15:16 - Updated: 2026-10-24 20:10
Summary
FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to version 1.4.3-beta, the `subtitlesHandler` endpoint (`GET /api/media/subtitles`) accepts two user-controlled query parameters: `path` and `name`, both of which are used in filesystem operations without sanitization, creating two independent path traversal vectors. The primary vector is the `path` parameter: it is passed directly to `idx.GetRealPath()` without calling `SanitizeUserPath()`, allowing an attacker to escape the storage root and set `parentDir` to any directory on the host. No existing anchor file is required. The secondary vector is the `name` parameter: it is joined with `parentDir` via `filepath.Join(parentDir, name)` without stripping directory components, allowing traversal relative to any resolved `parentDir`. Any authenticated user (regardless of role or permissions) can exploit either vector to read any text file readable by the server process, including `/etc/passwd`, SSH keys, database credentials, and JWT signing keys. Version 1.4.3-beta patches the issue.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "filebrowser",
          "vendor": "gtsteffaniak",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.4.3-beta"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to version 1.4.3-beta, the `subtitlesHandler` endpoint (`GET /api/media/subtitles`) accepts two user-controlled query parameters: `path` and `name`, both of which are used in filesystem operations without sanitization, creating two independent path traversal vectors. The primary vector is the `path` parameter: it is passed directly to `idx.GetRealPath()` without calling `SanitizeUserPath()`, allowing an attacker to escape the storage root and set `parentDir` to any directory on the host. No existing anchor file is required.  The secondary vector is the `name` parameter: it is joined with `parentDir` via `filepath.Join(parentDir, name)` without stripping directory components, allowing traversal relative to any resolved `parentDir`. Any authenticated user (regardless of role or permissions) can exploit either vector to read any text file readable by the server process, including `/etc/passwd`, SSH keys, database credentials, and JWT signing keys. Version 1.4.3-beta patches the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "FileBrowser Quantum es un gestor de archivos gratuito, autoalojado y basado en web. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 1.4.3-beta, el endpoint \u201csubtitlesHandler\u201d (\u201cGET /api/media/subtitles\u201d) acepta dos par\u00e1metros de consulta controlados por el usuario: \u201cpath\u201d y \u201cname\u201d, ambos utilizados en operaciones del sistema de archivos sin sanitizaci\u00f3n, creando dos vectores independientes de salto de ruta. El vector principal es el par\u00e1metro \u201cpath\u201d: se pasa directamente a \u201cidx.GetRealPath()\u201d sin llamar a \u201cSanitizeUserPath()\u201d, permitiendo a un atacante escapar de la ra\u00edz de almacenamiento y establecer \u201cparentDir\u201d a cualquier directorio en el host. No se requiere ning\u00fan archivo ancla existente. El vector secundario es el par\u00e1metro \u201cname\u201d: se une con \u201cparentDir\u201d a trav\u00e9s de \u201cfilepath.Join(parentDir, name)\u201d sin eliminar componentes de directorio, permitiendo el salto de ruta relativo a cualquier \u201cparentDir\u201d resuelto. Cualquier usuario autenticado (independientemente del rol o los permisos) puede explotar cualquiera de los vectores para leer cualquier archivo de texto legible por el proceso del servidor, incluyendo \u201c/etc/p4ssd\u201d, claves SSH, credenciales de base de datos y claves de firma JWT. La versi\u00f3n 1.4.3-beta corrige el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-54910",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T20:10:00.137",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.7,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
        "impactScore": 4.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-54910",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-20T14:51:53.928655Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-20T15:16:43.933",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/commit/f3f4bbe80cb569d664174aea874d7bfa008c3b5a"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-vvp7-h4fj-m28w"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-vvp7-h4fj-m28w"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-23"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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