FKIE_CVE-2026-54500
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-01 00:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 17:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "oj",
"vendor": "ohler55",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 3.17.3"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Oj (Optimized JSON) is a JSON parser and Object marshaller packaged as a Ruby gem. In versions prior to 3.17.3, Oj.load in :object mode reads uninitialized stack memory (and, for long keys, reads out of bounds) when parsing a JSON object whose key is 254 bytes or longer. The interned bytes can surface to the caller, disclosing process stack memory. In ext/oj/intern.c, form_attr() handles the long-key path by allocating a heap buffer, `b`, populating it with the attribute name, and then freeing it \u2014 but it passed the uninitialized stack buffer buf (not b) to rb_intern3(). rb_intern3 therefore reads len + 1 bytes of uninitialized stack memory. When the key length is \u003e= 256, it also reads out of bounds past the 256-byte buf. The resulting bytes are interned and can reach the caller via the produced Symbol or via the EncodingError message raised on invalid UTF-8, leaking process stack contents. This issue has been fixed in version 3.17.3."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Oj (Optimized JSON) es un analizador JSON y un serializador de objetos empaquetado como una gema de Ruby. En versiones anteriores a la 3.17.3, Oj.load en modo :object lee memoria de pila no inicializada (y, para claves largas, lee fuera de los l\u00edmites) al analizar un objeto JSON cuya clave tiene 254 bytes o m\u00e1s. Los bytes internados pueden llegar al llamador, revelando la memoria de pila del proceso. En ext/oj/intern.c, form_attr() maneja la ruta de clave larga asignando un b\u00fafer en el heap, \u2019b\u2019, rellen\u00e1ndolo con el nombre del atributo y luego liber\u00e1ndolo - pero pas\u00f3 el b\u00fafer de pila no inicializado buf (no \u2019b\u2019) a rb_intern3(). rb_intern3, por lo tanto, lee len + 1 bytes de memoria de pila no inicializada. Cuando la longitud de la clave es \u003e= 256, tambi\u00e9n lee fuera de los l\u00edmites m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del b\u00fafer buf de 256 bytes. Los bytes resultantes son internados y pueden llegar al llamador a trav\u00e9s del S\u00edmbolo producido o a trav\u00e9s del mensaje de EncodingError generado por UTF-8 no v\u00e1lido, filtrando el contenido de la pila del proceso. Este problema ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 3.17.3."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-54500",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T17:10:00.197",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-54500",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-01T13:34:29.080763Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-01T00:16:32.147",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/ohler55/oj/security/advisories/GHSA-fm7p-mprw-wjm9"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-908"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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