FKIE_CVE-2026-54412
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-14 18:17 - Updated: 2026-11-05 13:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/LiamBindle/MQTT-C",
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "MQTT-C",
"programFiles": [
"src/mqtt.c"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "mqtt_unpack_publish_response"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/LiamBindle/MQTT-C",
"vendor": "LiamBindle",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.1.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1.1.7",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "LiamBindle MQTT-C versions prior to 1.1.7 contain a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response() function in src/mqtt.c. A remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker, or capable of injecting MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session, can crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "LiamBindle MQTT-C hasta la versi\u00f3n 1.1.6 contiene una lectura fuera de l\u00edmites basada en el heap y un desbordamiento negativo de enteros en la funci\u00f3n mqtt_unpack_publish_response() en src/mqtt.c que permite a un atacante remoto no autenticado que controla un broker MQTT - o capaz de inyectar tr\u00e1fico MQTT en una sesi\u00f3n no cifrada - provocar la ca\u00edda de un cliente MQTT-C suscrito y potencialmente divulgar memoria adyacente del heap enviando un \u00fanico paquete PUBLISH manipulado. La funci\u00f3n solo valida que el remaining_length del encabezado fijo sea al menos 4, luego lee el campo topic_name_size de 16 bits del paquete controlado por el broker y avanza el puntero de an\u00e1lisis por ese valor sin verificar que topic_name_size m\u00e1s la sobrecarga circundante encaje dentro de remaining_length; posteriormente calcula application_message_size como remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) o - 4 (QoS mayor que 0) en aritm\u00e9tica sin signo, produciendo un desbordamiento negativo de enteros que luego se pasa a memmove(). Un paquete PUBLISH con topic_name_size = 0xFFFF y remaining_length = 7 avanza el puntero de an\u00e1lisis 65535 bytes m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del b\u00fafer de recepci\u00f3n (lectura fuera de l\u00edmites) y provoca un application_message_size cercano a 2^32, provocando la ca\u00edda del proceso cuando se ejecuta el memmove() resultante."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-54412",
"lastModified": "2026-11-05T13:17:07.963",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 4.2,
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "YES",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "PROOF_OF_CONCEPT",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "DIFFUSE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:X/V:D/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-54412",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-15T17:01:08.771614Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-14T18:17:20.750",
"references": [
{
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html"
},
{
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/191.html"
},
{
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"url": "https://github.com/LiamBindle/MQTT-C"
},
{
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"url": "https://github.com/LiamBindle/MQTT-C/blob/v1.1.6/src/mqtt.c#L1334"
},
{
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"url": "https://github.com/LiamBindle/MQTT-C/pull/208"
},
{
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"url": "https://github.com/LiamBindle/MQTT-C/releases/tag/v1.1.7"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-191"
}
],
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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