FKIE_CVE-2026-54270
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-22 18:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 23:10| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/security/advisories/GHSA-94rc-8x27-4472 | Mitigation, Vendor Advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| protobufjs_project | protobufjs | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "protobuf.js",
"vendor": "protobufjs",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e=8.2.0, \u003c 8.5.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:protobufjs_project:protobufjs:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A722DAF4-51C8-4165-8DFB-72D52BC31853",
"versionEndExcluding": "8.5.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "8.2.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. From 8.2.0 to 8.4.2, protobufjs preserved unknown wire elements in message.$unknowns and did not provide a decode-time option to discard unknown fields before retaining them. A crafted protobuf payload containing many unknown fields could therefore cause a decoded message to retain substantially more memory than the input size would suggest, even when unknown-field round-tripping is not needed. protobufjs 8.5.0 added the relevant decode-time options, allowing applications that decode untrusted protobuf data to disable unknown-field retention during decode. protobufjs 8.6.2 flips the default so unknown fields are discarded unless explicitly opted into."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "protobufjs compila definiciones de protobuf en funciones de JavaScript (JS). Desde la versi\u00f3n 8.2.0 hasta la 8.4.2, protobufjs conservaba elementos de cable desconocidos en message.$unknowns y no proporcionaba una opci\u00f3n en tiempo de decodificaci\u00f3n para descartar campos desconocidos antes de retenerlos. Una carga \u00fatil de protobuf manipulada que conten\u00eda muchos campos desconocidos podr\u00eda, por lo tanto, causar que un mensaje decodificado retuviera sustancialmente m\u00e1s memoria de lo que sugerir\u00eda el tama\u00f1o de entrada, incluso cuando no es necesario el viaje de ida y vuelta de campos desconocidos. protobufjs 8.5.0 a\u00f1adi\u00f3 las opciones relevantes en tiempo de decodificaci\u00f3n, permitiendo que las aplicaciones que decodifican datos protobuf no confiables deshabiliten la retenci\u00f3n de campos desconocidos durante la decodificaci\u00f3n. protobufjs 8.6.2 invierte el valor predeterminado de modo que los campos desconocidos se descartan a menos que se opte expl\u00edcitamente por ellos."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-54270",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T23:10:00.167",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-54270",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-23T14:47:41.353008Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-22T18:16:45.480",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/protobufjs/protobuf.js/security/advisories/GHSA-94rc-8x27-4472"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-770"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.