FKIE_CVE-2026-53425
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-20 18:16 - Updated: 2026-08-24 16:47
Severity
Summary
Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.
Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.
This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Samly.SPHandler\u0027"
],
"packageName": "samly",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/samly",
"product": "samly",
"programFiles": [
"lib/samly/sp_handler.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Samly.SPHandler\u0027:consume_signin_response/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/dropbox/samly",
"vendor": "dropbox",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.3.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Samly.SPHandler\u0027"
],
"packageName": "dropbox/samly",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/dropbox/samly",
"product": "samly",
"programFiles": [
"lib/samly/sp_handler.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Samly.SPHandler\u0027:consume_signin_response/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/dropbox/samly",
"vendor": "dropbox",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:handnot2:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Samly.SPHandler\u0027"
],
"packageName": "handnot2/samly",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/handnot2/samly",
"product": "samly",
"programFiles": [
"lib/samly/sp_handler.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Samly.SPHandler\u0027:consume_signin_response/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/handnot2/samly",
"vendor": "handnot2",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.\n\nSamly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim\u0027s session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.\n\nThis issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-53425",
"lastModified": "2026-08-24T16:47:56.007",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 7.6,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-53425",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-21T19:50:24.245049Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-20T18:16:27.850",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53425.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53425"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-345"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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