FKIE_CVE-2026-50181

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-10 00:16 - Updated: 2026-07-10 00:16
Severity
7.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Summary
Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, Langroid's `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`. As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory. This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory. Version 0.64.0 patches the issue.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/langroid/langroid/commit/56e2756ecab70a70a7e6edbee2f2187b8484683e
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/langroid/langroid/security/advisories/GHSA-fg23-3346-88f5
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "langroid",
          "vendor": "langroid",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.64.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, Langroid\u0027s `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`. As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory. This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory. Version 0.64.0 patches the issue."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-50181",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-10T00:16:33.340",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-10T00:16:33.340",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/langroid/langroid/commit/56e2756ecab70a70a7e6edbee2f2187b8484683e"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/langroid/langroid/security/advisories/GHSA-fg23-3346-88f5"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-23"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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