FKIE_CVE-2026-48990
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-17 22:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 12:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "joserfc",
"vendor": "authlib",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 1.6.7"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. In versions 1.3.4 through 1.6.5, joserfc accepts oversized RFC7797 b64=false JWS payloads without applying JWSRegistry.max_payload_length, which can lead to resource exhaustion. The normal JWS compact and flattened JSON paths reject payloads above the configured payload-size limit with ExceededSizeError. The RFC7797 unencoded payload paths do not make the same check. A valid b64=false compact or flattened JSON JWS can therefore deserialize successfully with a payload larger than JWSRegistry.max_payload_length. Applications that accept lower-trust JWS values and rely on joserfc to reject oversized token content during verification have a moderate availability risk. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.7."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "joserfc es una biblioteca de Python que proporciona una implementaci\u00f3n de varios est\u00e1ndares de Firma y Cifrado de Objetos JSON (JOSE). En las versiones 1.3.4 a 1.6.5, joserfc acepta cargas \u00fatiles JWS RFC7797 b64=false de tama\u00f1o excesivo sin aplicar JWSRegistry.max_payload_length, lo que puede llevar al agotamiento de recursos. Las rutas JSON JWS compactas y aplanadas normales rechazan las cargas \u00fatiles que superan el l\u00edmite de tama\u00f1o de carga \u00fatil configurado con ExceededSizeError. Las rutas de carga \u00fatil sin codificar RFC7797 no realizan la misma comprobaci\u00f3n. Un JWS JSON compacto o aplanado b64=false v\u00e1lido puede, por lo tanto, deserializarse correctamente con una carga \u00fatil mayor que JWSRegistry.max_payload_length. Las aplicaciones que aceptan valores JWS de menor confianza y dependen de joserfc para rechazar contenido de token de tama\u00f1o excesivo durante la verificaci\u00f3n tienen un riesgo de disponibilidad moderado. Este problema ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 1.6.7."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-48990",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T12:10:00.130",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-48990",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-18T12:51:44.745917Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-17T22:16:23.270",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/authlib/joserfc/releases/tag/1.6.7"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/authlib/joserfc/security/advisories/GHSA-wphv-vfrh-23q5"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/authlib/joserfc/security/advisories/GHSA-wphv-vfrh-23q5"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-400"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-770"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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