FKIE_CVE-2026-47410
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-21 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 19:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "praisonai-platform",
"vendor": "MervinPraison",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.1.4"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `\"dev-secret-change-me\"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != \"dev\"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `\"dev\"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "PraisonAI Platform es la capa de plataforma para el sistema de equipos multiagente de PraisonAI. Las versiones anteriores a la 0.1.4 tienen una clave criptogr\u00e1fica predeterminada insegura. El secreto de firma JWT se establece por defecto en el literal incrustado \u201c\u2019dev-secret-change-me\u2019\u201d cuando \u201cPLATFORM_JWT_SECRET\u201d no est\u00e1 configurado. Existe una comprobaci\u00f3n de seguridad, pero solo se activa cuando \u201cPLATFORM_ENV != \u2019dev\u2019\u201d; el valor predeterminado de \u201cPLATFORM_ENV\u201d es \u201c\u2019dev\u2019\u201d, por lo que la comprobaci\u00f3n se omite silenciosamente en cualquier despliegue que no opte expl\u00edcitamente por no usarlo. El atacante lee el literal de este archivo fuente p\u00fablico, genera un JWT con reclamaciones \u201csub\u201d y \u201cemail\u201d arbitrarias, y se autentica como cualquier usuario existente (incluidos los propietarios y administradores del espacio de trabajo). La versi\u00f3n 0.1.4 de PraisonAI Platform soluciona el problema."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-47410",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T19:10:00.127",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-47410",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-22T14:43:11.937484Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-21T17:17:09.773",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/ef79b7a0561796ad9807f0f09538c25cc78d3619"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/pull/1685"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-321"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-798"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.