FKIE_CVE-2026-47407

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-21 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 19:10
Severity
9.4 (Critical) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Summary
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource's own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL's `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role="member"` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/24385d64876577620f749957bd4814f162f4ca47
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/pull/1686
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-h8q5-cp56-rr65
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-h8q5-cp56-rr65
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "praisonai-platform",
          "vendor": "MervinPraison",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.1.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource\u0027s own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL\u0027s `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace\u0027s resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role=\"member\"` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "PraisonAI Platform es la capa de plataforma para el sistema de equipos multiagente de PraisonAI. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 0.1.4, el servidor de la Plataforma expone recursos bajo \u201c/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...\u201d y los protege con una dependencia de FastAPI \u201crequire_workspace_member(workspace_id)\u201d. La dependencia solo verifica que el llamador es miembro del workspace_id en el prefijo de la URL. Los manejadores de ruta luego buscan el recurso interno (\u201cagent_id\u201d, \u201cissue_id\u201d, \u201cproject_id\u201d, \u201clabel_id\u201d, \u201ccomment_id\u201d, \u201cdependency_id\u201d) solo por clave primaria. El \u201cworkspace_id\u201d propio del recurso nunca se compara con el \u201cworkspace_id\u201d de la URL. Un usuario puede, por lo tanto, poner su propio espacio de trabajo en el prefijo de la URL y el ID de recurso de cualquier otro espacio de trabajo en la ruta. La verificaci\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n pasa, ya que realmente son miembros del espacio de trabajo del prefijo. El servicio luego devuelve el recurso entre inquilinos para lectura, actualizaci\u00f3n o eliminaci\u00f3n. Hay un segundo error en las rutas de gesti\u00f3n de miembros (\u201cadd_member\u201d, \u201cupdate_member_role\u201d, \u201cremove_member\u201d, \u201cupdate_workspace\u201d, \u201cdelete_workspace\u201d). Cada una hereda el valor predeterminado \u201cmin_role=\u201cmember\u201d\u201d de \u201crequire_workspace_member\u201d. Cualquier miembro b\u00e1sico puede, por lo tanto, promoverse a administrador o propietario, degradar o eliminar a otros miembros, y eliminar el espacio de trabajo. La jerarqu\u00eda de roles existe en el esquema pero no se aplica. El registro est\u00e1 abierto en \u201c/api/v1/auth/register\u201d sin verificaci\u00f3n de correo electr\u00f3nico. El enlace de servidor predeterminado es \u201c0.0.0.0:8000\u201d (\u201cpython -m praisonai_platform\u201d). Un solo curl desde cualquier posici\u00f3n de red no autenticada es suficiente para arrancar en el sistema. PraisonAI Platform versi\u00f3n 0.1.4 corrige el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-47407",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T19:10:00.127",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 9.4,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-47407",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-22T14:15:03.095254Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-21T17:17:09.363",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/24385d64876577620f749957bd4814f162f4ca47"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/pull/1686"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-h8q5-cp56-rr65"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-h8q5-cp56-rr65"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-639"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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