FKIE_CVE-2026-44240
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-12 21:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 17:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "basic-ftp",
"vendor": "patrickjuchli",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 5.3.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "basic-ftp is an FTP client for Node.js. Prior to 5.3.1, basic-ftp is vulnerable to client-side denial of service when parsing FTP control-channel multiline responses. A malicious or compromised FTP server can send an unterminated multiline response during the initial FTP banner phase, before authentication. The client keeps appending attacker-controlled data into FtpContext._partialResponse and repeatedly reparses the accumulated buffer without enforcing a maximum control response size. As a result, an application using basic-ftp can remain stuck in connect() while memory and CPU usage grow under attacker-controlled input. This can lead to process-level denial of service, container OOM kills, worker restarts, queue backlog, or service degradation in applications that automatically connect to FTP endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.3.1."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "basic-ftp es un cliente FTP para Node.js. Antes de la 5.3.1, basic-ftp es vulnerable a una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio del lado del cliente al analizar respuestas multil\u00ednea del canal de control FTP. Un servidor FTP malicioso o comprometido puede enviar una respuesta multil\u00ednea no terminada durante la fase inicial del banner FTP, antes de la autenticaci\u00f3n. El cliente sigue a\u00f1adiendo datos controlados por el atacante en FtpContext._partialResponse y vuelve a analizar repetidamente el b\u00fafer acumulado sin aplicar un tama\u00f1o m\u00e1ximo de respuesta de control. Como resultado, una aplicaci\u00f3n que utiliza basic-ftp puede quedarse atascada en connect() mientras el uso de memoria y CPU crece bajo la entrada controlada por el atacante. Esto puede llevar a denegaci\u00f3n de servicio a nivel de proceso, eliminaciones OOM de contenedores, reinicios de trabajadores, acumulaci\u00f3n de cola o degradaci\u00f3n del servicio en aplicaciones que se conectan autom\u00e1ticamente a puntos finales FTP. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en la versi\u00f3n 5.3.1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-44240",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T17:10:03.270",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-44240",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-14T12:31:54.775969Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-12T21:16:16.410",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/security/advisories/GHSA-rpmf-866q-6p89"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/security/advisories/GHSA-rpmf-866q-6p89"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-400"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-770"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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