FKIE_CVE-2026-43940

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-08 04:16 - Updated: 2026-11-11 23:10
Summary
electerm is an open-sourced terminal/ssh/sftp/telnet/serialport/RDP/VNC/Spice/ftp client. Prior to version 3.7.16, the runWidget function in src/app/widgets/load-widget.js constructs a file path by directly concatenating user‑supplied widget identifiers without any sanitisation. Because runWidget is exposed to the renderer process via an asynchronous IPC handler with no input validation, an attacker who achieves JavaScript execution inside the renderer (for example, through a malicious plugin or a cross‑site scripting flaw in the built‑in webview) can abuse a path traversal (../) to load and execute an arbitrary JavaScript file anywhere on the victim’s filesystem. This gives the attacker local code execution with the full privileges of the electerm process, leading to complete system compromise. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.16.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
electerm_project electerm *

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "electerm",
          "vendor": "electerm",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.7.16"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:electerm_project:electerm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "6E0CF034-D768-4369-9CD6-B59CD34B03CD",
              "versionEndExcluding": "3.7.16",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "electerm is an open-sourced terminal/ssh/sftp/telnet/serialport/RDP/VNC/Spice/ftp client. Prior to version 3.7.16, the runWidget function in src/app/widgets/load-widget.js constructs a file path by directly concatenating user\u2011supplied widget identifiers without any sanitisation. Because runWidget is exposed to the renderer process via an asynchronous IPC handler with no input validation, an attacker who achieves JavaScript execution inside the renderer (for example, through a malicious plugin or a cross\u2011site scripting flaw in the built\u2011in webview) can abuse a path traversal (../) to load and execute an arbitrary JavaScript file anywhere on the victim\u2019s filesystem. This gives the attacker local code execution with the full privileges of the electerm process, leading to complete system compromise. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.16."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "electerm es un cliente de terminal/ssh/sftp/telnet/puerto serie/RDP/VNC/Spice/ftp de c\u00f3digo abierto. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 3.7.16, la funci\u00f3n runWidget en src/app/widgets/load-widget.js construye una ruta de archivo concatenando directamente identificadores de widget proporcionados por el usuario sin ninguna sanitizaci\u00f3n. Debido a que runWidget est\u00e1 expuesto al proceso de renderizado a trav\u00e9s de un gestor IPC as\u00edncrono sin validaci\u00f3n de entrada, un atacante que logra la ejecuci\u00f3n de JavaScript dentro del renderizador (por ejemplo, a trav\u00e9s de un plugin malicioso o una falla de cross-site scripting en el webview incorporado) puede abusar de un salto de ruta (.. / ) para cargar y ejecutar un archivo JavaScript arbitrario en cualquier lugar del sistema de archivos de la v\u00edctima. Esto le da al atacante ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo local con los privilegios completos del proceso electerm, lo que lleva a un compromiso completo del sistema. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 3.7.16."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-43940",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-11T23:10:00.263",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.4,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.5,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-43940",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-05-08T12:52:37.558703Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-08T04:16:23.023",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/electerm/electerm/releases/tag/v3.7.16"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/electerm/electerm/security/advisories/GHSA-f77v-9vpc-6pjm"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-829"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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