FKIE_CVE-2026-40871
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-21 20:17 - Updated: 2026-10-26 22:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "mailcow-dockerized",
"vendor": "mailcow",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 2026-03b"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "mailcow: dockerized is an open source groupware/email suite based on docker. Versions prior to 2026-03b have a second-order SQL injection vulnerability in the quarantine_category field via the Mailcow API. The /api/v1/add/mailbox endpoint stores quarantine_category without validation or sanitization. This value is later used by quarantine_notify.py, which constructs SQL queries using unsafe % string formatting instead of parameterized queries. This results in a delayed (second-order) SQL injection when the quarantine notification job executes, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary SQL. Using a UNION SELECT, sensitive data (e.g., admin credentials) can be exfiltrated and rendered inside quarantine notification emails. Version 2026-03b fixes the vulnerability."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "mailcow: dockerized es una suite de groupware/correo electr\u00f3nico de c\u00f3digo abierto basada en docker. Las versiones anteriores a 2026-03b tienen una vulnerabilidad de inyecci\u00f3n SQL de segundo orden en el campo quarantine_category a trav\u00e9s de la API de Mailcow. El endpoint /api/v1/add/mailbox almacena quarantine_category sin validaci\u00f3n ni saneamiento. Este valor es utilizado posteriormente por quarantine_notify.py, que construye consultas SQL utilizando formato de cadena % inseguro en lugar de consultas parametrizadas. Esto resulta en una inyecci\u00f3n SQL retrasada (de segundo orden) cuando se ejecuta el trabajo de notificaci\u00f3n de cuarentena, permitiendo a un atacante inyectar SQL arbitrario. Usando un UNION SELECT, los datos sensibles (p. ej., credenciales de administrador) pueden ser exfiltrados y renderizados dentro de los correos electr\u00f3nicos de notificaci\u00f3n de cuarentena. La versi\u00f3n 2026-03b corrige la vulnerabilidad."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-40871",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T22:10:00.163",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.2,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-40871",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-04-21T19:53:34.653739Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-04-21T20:17:00.527",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized/security/advisories/GHSA-r8fq-wrfm-cj2q"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized/security/advisories/GHSA-r8fq-wrfm-cj2q"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-20"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-89"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-116"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-564"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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