FKIE_CVE-2026-39855
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-09 17:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 22:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| osslsigncode_project | osslsigncode | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "osslsigncode",
"vendor": "mtrojnar",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 2.13"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:osslsigncode_project:osslsigncode:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "3F16716F-B2C3-41F9-B32B-CFD011129F12",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.13",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "osslsigncode is a tool that implements Authenticode signing and timestamping. Prior to 2.13, an integer underflow vulnerability exists in osslsigncode version 2.12 and earlier in the PE page-hash computation code (pe_page_hash_calc()). When page hash processing is performed on a PE file, the function subtracts hdrsize from pagesize without first validating that pagesize \u003e= hdrsize. If a malicious PE file sets SizeOfHeaders (hdrsize) larger than SectionAlignment (pagesize), the subtraction underflows and produces a very large unsigned length. The code allocates a zero-filled buffer of pagesize bytes and then attempts to hash pagesize - hdrsize bytes from that buffer. After the underflow, this results in an out-of-bounds read from the heap and can crash the process. The vulnerability can be triggered while signing a malicious PE file with page hashing enabled (-ph), or while verifying a malicious signed PE file that already contains page hashes. Verification of an already signed file does not require the verifier to pass -ph. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "osslsigncode es una herramienta que implementa la firma Authenticode y el sellado de tiempo. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 2.13, existe una vulnerabilidad de desbordamiento negativo de enteros en osslsigncode versi\u00f3n 2.12 y anteriores en el c\u00f3digo de c\u00e1lculo de hash de p\u00e1gina PE (pe_page_hash_calc()). Cuando se realiza el procesamiento de hash de p\u00e1gina en un archivo PE, la funci\u00f3n resta hdrsize de pagesize sin validar primero que pagesize \u003e= hdrsize. Si un archivo PE malicioso establece SizeOfHeaders (hdrsize) mayor que SectionAlignment (pagesize), la resta sufre un desbordamiento negativo y produce una longitud sin signo muy grande. El c\u00f3digo asigna un b\u00fafer rellenado con ceros de pagesize bytes y luego intenta aplicar hash a pagesize - hdrsize bytes de ese b\u00fafer. Despu\u00e9s del desbordamiento negativo, esto resulta en una lectura fuera de l\u00edmites de la pila y puede bloquear el proceso. La vulnerabilidad puede ser activada mientras se firma un archivo PE malicioso con el hash de p\u00e1gina habilitado (-ph), o mientras se verifica un archivo PE firmado malicioso que ya contiene hashes de p\u00e1gina. La verificaci\u00f3n de un archivo ya firmado no requiere que el verificador pase -ph. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en la versi\u00f3n 2.13."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-39855",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T22:10:00.163",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-39855",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-04-09T19:12:57.585841Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-04-09T17:16:29.140",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode/commit/2a5409b7c4b6c6fad2b093531e8fea6cf08e1568"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Product",
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode/releases/tag/2.13"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode/security/advisories/GHSA-76vv-x5rr-q3mr"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-190"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-191"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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