FKIE_CVE-2026-27886
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-14 19:16 - Updated: 2026-11-11 20:10{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "strapi",
"vendor": "strapi",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 5.37.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:strapi:strapi:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "B26282D5-D04D-4F7A-9BDC-870D8C8A21D3",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.37.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Strapi is an open source headless content management system. Strapi versions starting in 4.0.0 and prior to 5.37.0 did not sufficiently sanitize query parameters when filtering content via relational fields. An unauthenticated attacker could use the `where` query parameter on any publicly-accessible content-type with an `updatedBy` (or other admin-relation) field to perform a boolean-oracle attack against private fields on the joined `admin_users` table, including the `resetPasswordToken` field. Extracting an admin reset token via this oracle made full administrative account takeover possible without authentication. When a filter such as `where[updatedBy][resetPasswordToken][$startsWith]=a` was applied to a public Content API endpoint, the underlying query generation performed a `LEFT JOIN` against the `admin_users` table and emitted a `WHERE` clause referencing the joined column. The query parameter sanitization layer did not block operator chains that traversed into relational target schemas the caller had no read permission on, allowing the response count to be used as a one-bit oracle on any admin-table field. The patch in version 5.37.0 introduces explicit query-parameter sanitization at the controller and service boundary via three new primitives: `strictParam`, `addQueryParams`, and `addBodyParams`. Operator chains that traverse into restricted relational targets are now rejected before reaching the database."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Strapi es un sistema de gesti\u00f3n de contenido \u2019headless\u2019 de c\u00f3digo abierto. Las versiones de Strapi a partir de la 4.0.0 y anteriores a la 5.37.0 no sanitizaban suficientemente los par\u00e1metros de consulta al filtrar contenido a trav\u00e9s de campos relacionales. Un atacante no autenticado podr\u00eda usar el par\u00e1metro de consulta \u2019where\u2019 en cualquier tipo de contenido de acceso p\u00fablico con un campo \u2019updatedBy\u2019 (u otra relaci\u00f3n de administrador) para realizar un ataque de or\u00e1culo booleano contra campos privados en la tabla \u2019admin_users\u2019 unida, incluyendo el campo \u2019resetPasswordToken\u2019. La extracci\u00f3n de un token de restablecimiento de administrador a trav\u00e9s de este or\u00e1culo hizo posible la toma de control total de la cuenta administrativa sin autenticaci\u00f3n. Cuando se aplicaba un filtro como \u2019where[updatedBy][resetPasswordToken][$startsWith]=a\u2019 a un endpoint de la API de Contenido p\u00fablico, la generaci\u00f3n de consulta subyacente realizaba un \u2019LEFT JOIN\u2019 contra la tabla \u2019admin_users\u2019 y emit\u00eda una cl\u00e1usula \u2019WHERE\u2019 que hac\u00eda referencia a la columna unida. La capa de sanitizaci\u00f3n de par\u00e1metros de consulta no bloqueaba las cadenas de operadores que atravesaban esquemas de destino relacionales sobre los cuales el llamador no ten\u00eda permiso de lectura, permitiendo que el recuento de la respuesta se utilizara como un or\u00e1culo de un bit en cualquier campo de la tabla de administrador. El parche en la versi\u00f3n 5.37.0 introduce una sanitizaci\u00f3n expl\u00edcita de par\u00e1metros de consulta en el l\u00edmite del controlador y del servicio a trav\u00e9s de tres nuevas primitivas: \u2019strictParam\u2019, \u2019addQueryParams\u2019 y \u2019addBodyParams\u2019. Las cadenas de operadores que atraviesan objetivos relacionales restringidos ahora son rechazadas antes de llegar a la base de datos."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-27886",
"lastModified": "2026-11-11T20:10:00.273",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 9.2,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-27886",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-14T19:38:33.514090Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-14T19:16:31.580",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-rjg2-95x7-8qmx"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-22"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-200"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-943"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.