FKIE_CVE-2026-15712
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-14 19:16 - Updated: 2026-11-06 18:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux:10"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "libsoup3",
"product": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
}
],
"source": "secalert@redhat.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A heap buffer over-read vulnerability was discovered in libsoup\u0027s (versions: libsoup 3.0 to 3.7.0) HTTP/2 connection tracking framework. When the library processes an HTTP/2 GOAWAY frame, it improperly handles the \"Additional Debug Data\" payload by assuming the data stream is a safely NUL-terminated C-string. Because the parser lacks strict length-boundary verification before reading this data, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can intentionally send a malformed GOAWAY frame missing the appropriate null delimiter. This causes the library to read past the end of the allocated buffer, triggering an application crash that results in a denial of service (DoS), or potentially exposing fragments of memory contents."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Una vulnerabilidad de lectura excesiva de b\u00fafer de pila fue descubierta en el framework de seguimiento de conexiones HTTP/2 de libsoup (versiones: libsoup 3.0 a 3.7.0). Cuando la biblioteca procesa un marco GOAWAY de HTTP/2, maneja incorrectamente la carga \u00fatil \u2019Additional Debug Data\u2019 al asumir que el flujo de datos es una cadena C terminada en NUL de forma segura. Debido a que el analizador carece de una verificaci\u00f3n estricta de los l\u00edmites de longitud antes de leer estos datos, un atacante remoto no autenticado puede enviar intencionalmente un marco GOAWAY malformado al que le falta el delimitador nulo apropiado. Esto hace que la biblioteca lea m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del final del b\u00fafer asignado, lo que provoca un fallo de la aplicaci\u00f3n que resulta en una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio (DoS), o potencialmente exponiendo fragmentos del contenido de la memoria."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-15712",
"lastModified": "2026-11-06T18:18:07.673",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-15712",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-14T19:15:34.225845Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-14T19:16:51.313",
"references": [
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-15712"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2499939"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/work_items/540"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/work_items/540"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "secalert@redhat.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
}
],
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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