FKIE_CVE-2026-14456
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-13 15:19 - Updated: 2026-08-13 18:17
Severity
Summary
Issue summary: When an OpenSSL QUIC server (Listener SSL object) processes
valid QUIC Initial packets for unknown destination connection IDs, it
can allocate and queue new incoming channels without enforcing any limit.
Impact summary: A remote peer that can make many Initial packets reach the
server listener faster than the application accepts connections, can cause the
memory allocated to store the per-channel state to grow without any limits,
potentially making the QUIC listener unavailable and causing Denial of Service.
CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Description: The function that handles inbound QUIC packets uses
Connection-Id from the packet header to find an existing connection
(QUIC channel). If no existing connection is found and the packet
type is INITIAL, the function treats the packet as a new connection. It
allocates a new channel object and inserts it into a queue where it
waits to be accepted by the local application with SSL_accept(3ossl).
The memory occupied by these initial channel objects may grow
without bounds if the application is not able to call SSL_accept()
frequently enough to serve these inbound connection requests.
The issue is present since OpenSSL 3.5 when the QUIC server implementation
was added.
The fix introduces a limit for pending connections. The default limit is set
to 256 pending connections (waiting to be accepted by the local application).
Applications may change the default by calling SSL_set_value_uint(3ossl).
FIPS impact: no
The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of
the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": "OpenSSL",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.0.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.6.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.6.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.5.8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.5.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Issue summary: When an OpenSSL QUIC server (Listener SSL object) processes\nvalid QUIC Initial packets for unknown destination connection IDs, it\ncan allocate and queue new incoming channels without enforcing any limit.\n\nImpact summary: A remote peer that can make many Initial packets reach the\nserver listener faster than the application accepts connections, can cause the\nmemory allocated to store the per-channel state to grow without any limits,\npotentially making the QUIC listener unavailable and causing Denial of Service.\n\nCWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\nDescription: The function that handles inbound QUIC packets uses\nConnection-Id from the packet header to find an existing connection\n(QUIC channel). If no existing connection is found and the packet\ntype is INITIAL, the function treats the packet as a new connection. It\nallocates a new channel object and inserts it into a queue where it\nwaits to be accepted by the local application with SSL_accept(3ossl).\nThe memory occupied by these initial channel objects may grow\nwithout bounds if the application is not able to call SSL_accept()\nfrequently enough to serve these inbound connection requests.\n\nThe issue is present since OpenSSL 3.5 when the QUIC server implementation\nwas added.\n\nThe fix introduces a limit for pending connections. The default limit is set\nto 256 pending connections (waiting to be accepted by the local application).\nApplications may change the default by calling SSL_set_value_uint(3ossl).\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of\nthe OpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-14456",
"lastModified": "2026-08-13T18:17:18.367",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-14456",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-13T17:41:23.819585Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-13T15:19:31.820",
"references": [
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/08e7756c3900bcfd77a720e7b74e27d6e4ed01a9"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4084152e040329ca0194c4c1750b9b46d00a5b6b"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f2f1465f2d2e5c61dfeac4d20fd093797d821139"
},
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260813.txt"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/13/4"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-770"
}
],
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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