FKIE_CVE-2026-13343
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-24 16:16 - Updated: 2026-08-26 16:59
Severity
Summary
The UMP Stream responder library in lib/midi2/ump_stream_responder.c builds reply packets in a 16-byte struct midi_ump (uint32_t data[4]). The builders make_endpoint_info() and make_function_block_info() populate only the first two words (res.data[0] and res.data[1]) and, before this fix, declared their result as an uninitialised local (struct midi_ump res;). The remaining two words (res.data[2], res.data[3]) retain stale stack contents.
Endpoint Info and Function Block Info notifications are UMP Stream messages (UMP_MT_UMP_STREAM), which are 4 words long, so the full 16-byte packet — including the two uninitialised words — is transmitted verbatim by cfg->send(). The responder is driven by attacker-supplied UMP Stream Endpoint-Discovery / Function-Block-Discovery requests via ump_stream_respond(). In the in-tree Network MIDI 2.0 server (subsys/net/lib/midi2/netmidi2.c) these requests arrive as UDP datagrams and, with the default no-authentication endpoint, a remote peer can establish a session and trigger the responses; the same library also serves USB MIDI 2.0 hosts.
Each discovery request causes the device to disclose 8 bytes of its own uninitialised stack memory to the peer, and the request is freely repeatable. This is a confidentiality-only information leak (root cause is use of an uninitialised variable, CWE-457/CWE-908); the leaked words could include residual data or pointer values. There is no memory-corruption, integrity, or availability impact.
The fix zero-initialises both result structs (struct midi_ump res = {0};), so the trailing words are cleared before transmission. These are the only two responder builders that left trailing words unset (send_string() already zeroes its buffer), so the leak is fully closed.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"product": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"lib/midi2/ump_stream_responder.c"
],
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.4.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.3.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The UMP Stream responder library in lib/midi2/ump_stream_responder.c builds reply packets in a 16-byte struct midi_ump (uint32_t data[4]). The builders make_endpoint_info() and make_function_block_info() populate only the first two words (res.data[0] and res.data[1]) and, before this fix, declared their result as an uninitialised local (struct midi_ump res;). The remaining two words (res.data[2], res.data[3]) retain stale stack contents.\n\nEndpoint Info and Function Block Info notifications are UMP Stream messages (UMP_MT_UMP_STREAM), which are 4 words long, so the full 16-byte packet \u2014 including the two uninitialised words \u2014 is transmitted verbatim by cfg-\u003esend(). The responder is driven by attacker-supplied UMP Stream Endpoint-Discovery / Function-Block-Discovery requests via ump_stream_respond(). In the in-tree Network MIDI 2.0 server (subsys/net/lib/midi2/netmidi2.c) these requests arrive as UDP datagrams and, with the default no-authentication endpoint, a remote peer can establish a session and trigger the responses; the same library also serves USB MIDI 2.0 hosts.\n\nEach discovery request causes the device to disclose 8 bytes of its own uninitialised stack memory to the peer, and the request is freely repeatable. This is a confidentiality-only information leak (root cause is use of an uninitialised variable, CWE-457/CWE-908); the leaked words could include residual data or pointer values. There is no memory-corruption, integrity, or availability impact.\n\nThe fix zero-initialises both result structs (struct midi_ump res = {0};), so the trailing words are cleared before transmission. These are the only two responder builders that left trailing words unset (send_string() already zeroes its buffer), so the leak is fully closed."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-13343",
"lastModified": "2026-08-26T16:59:23.267",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-13343",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-24T20:20:21.608785Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-24T16:16:55.530",
"references": [
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/255e64bd22fcd02bd437bb0d6badac87c67de23b"
},
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4w5x-w7j4-6xxc"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-200"
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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