FKIE_CVE-2026-120513

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-10 07:16 - Updated: 2026-11-10 07:16
Summary
The Everest Forms – Contact Form, Payment Form, Quiz, Survey & Custom Form Builder with AI plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the remove_csv_file_after_email_send function in all versions up to, and including, 3.6.2 This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete files within the wp-content/uploads directory on the server, which can lead to loss of uploaded content. On hardened Apache configurations, deletion of uploads/.htaccess can re-enable PHP execution inside the uploads directory. This attack is only possible when the Save-and-Continue addon is active (EVF_SAVE_AND_CONTINUE_VERSION is defined) and the 'Disable storing entry information' setting is enabled on the target form. Escaping the uploads directory and deleting files in the site root can be possible under rare circumstances.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Everest Forms \u2013 Contact Form, Payment Form, Quiz, Survey \u0026 Custom Form Builder with AI",
          "vendor": "wpeverest",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "3.6.2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Everest Forms \u2013 Contact Form, Payment Form, Quiz, Survey \u0026 Custom Form Builder with AI plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the remove_csv_file_after_email_send function in all versions up to, and including, 3.6.2 This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete files within the wp-content/uploads directory on the server, which can lead to loss of uploaded content. On hardened Apache configurations, deletion of uploads/.htaccess can re-enable PHP execution inside the uploads directory. This attack is only possible when the Save-and-Continue addon is active (EVF_SAVE_AND_CONTINUE_VERSION is defined) and the \u0027Disable storing entry information\u0027 setting is enabled on the target form. Escaping the uploads directory and deleting files in the site root can be possible under rare circumstances."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-120513",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-10T07:16:52.000",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 8.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-11-10T07:16:51.733",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/everest-forms/tags/3.6.2/includes/abstracts/class-evf-form-fields-upload.php#L1396"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/everest-forms/tags/3.6.2/includes/abstracts/class-evf-form-fields-upload.php#L1680"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/everest-forms/tags/3.6.2/includes/class-evf-ajax.php#L681"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/everest-forms/tags/3.6.2/includes/class-evf-form-task.php#L594"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3747723/everest-forms/trunk/includes/abstracts/class-evf-form-fields-upload.php"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0d61468b-8fda-4775-8099-a34ddf34566b?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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