FKIE_CVE-2026-107494

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-18 12:17 - Updated: 2026-11-20 19:18
Summary
Issue summary: The QUIC stack queues a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame also for retransmitted NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames. This allows a remote malicious QUIC stack to queue an unlimited number of RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames. Impact summary: A malicious remote QUIC peer can trigger an out-of-memory condition causing a Denial of Service. CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Description: The earlier fix for CVE-2026-84784 was not complete. It failed to ignore retransmissions of the NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame. The QUIC implementation created and inserted a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame for every retransmitted NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame it received and there was no limit on how many RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames were queued. This allows a malicious remote QUIC stack to trigger an out-of-memory (OOM) condition. FIPS impact: no The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "OpenSSL",
          "vendor": "OpenSSL",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.1.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.1.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.0.4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.0.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3.5.10",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.5.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Issue summary: The QUIC stack queues a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame also for\nretransmitted NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames. This allows a remote malicious\nQUIC stack to queue an unlimited number of RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.\n\nImpact summary: A malicious remote QUIC peer can trigger an out-of-memory\ncondition causing a Denial of Service.\n\nCWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\nDescription: The earlier fix for CVE-2026-84784 was not complete. It\nfailed to ignore retransmissions of the NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame. The QUIC\nimplementation created and inserted a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame for every\nretransmitted NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame it received and there was no limit\non how many RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames were queued.\nThis allows a malicious remote QUIC stack to trigger an out-of-memory (OOM)\ncondition.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside the\nOpenSSL FIPS module boundary."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-107494",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-20T19:18:34.563",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-107494",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-11-19T21:18:43.234811Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-11-18T12:17:01.347",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/33544"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-770"
        }
      ],
      "source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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