FKIE_CVE-2026-10675

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-21 22:16 - Updated: 2026-07-22 20:16
Summary
In Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV provisioning bearer (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/pb_adv.c), prov_msg_recv() rescheduled the provisioning protocol watchdog timer unconditionally at the top of the function, before the FCS check and before the ADV_LINK_INVALID check. Once a provisioning attempt fails, prov_failed() sets ADV_LINK_INVALID and the only recovery path is the protocol timer firing (protocol_timeout -> prov_link_close -> close_link -> reset_adv_link and re-enabling of scanning and the unprovisioned device beacon). A remote, unauthenticated attacker on the BLE advertising channel can first induce a provisioning failure (e.g. with a malformed generic-provisioning PDU) and then transmit any FCS-valid PB-ADV transaction PDU on the same link ID more often than once per protocol timeout (60 s, or 120 s for OOB input/output). Because each such packet reset the timer even on an invalidated link, protocol_timeout never fired, the dead link was never torn down, and the device remained pinned in an un-provisionable state with its unprovisioned beacon disabled and new Link Open requests rejected. PB-ADV PDUs are processed without authentication and the FCS is a keyless CRC, so no pairing or prior trust is required and the attacker chooses the link ID itself. The impact is a persistent denial of provisioning/re-provisioning service; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact. The vulnerable code shipped in releases through v4.4.1. The fix moves the timer reschedule to after the ADV_LINK_INVALID check (and the FCS check before the reset) so an invalidated link can no longer be kept alive by incoming packets.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/bluetooth/mesh/pb_adv.c"
          ],
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.5.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.5.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In Zephyr\u0027s Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV provisioning bearer (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/pb_adv.c), prov_msg_recv() rescheduled the provisioning protocol watchdog timer unconditionally at the top of the function, before the FCS check and before the ADV_LINK_INVALID check. Once a provisioning attempt fails, prov_failed() sets ADV_LINK_INVALID and the only recovery path is the protocol timer firing (protocol_timeout -\u003e prov_link_close -\u003e close_link -\u003e reset_adv_link and re-enabling of scanning and the unprovisioned device beacon).\n\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker on the BLE advertising channel can first induce a provisioning failure (e.g. with a malformed generic-provisioning PDU) and then transmit any FCS-valid PB-ADV transaction PDU on the same link ID more often than once per protocol timeout (60 s, or 120 s for OOB input/output). Because each such packet reset the timer even on an invalidated link, protocol_timeout never fired, the dead link was never torn down, and the device remained pinned in an un-provisionable state with its unprovisioned beacon disabled and new Link Open requests rejected.\n\nPB-ADV PDUs are processed without authentication and the FCS is a keyless CRC, so no pairing or prior trust is required and the attacker chooses the link ID itself. The impact is a persistent denial of provisioning/re-provisioning service; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact.\n\nThe vulnerable code shipped in releases through v4.4.1. The fix moves the timer reschedule to after the ADV_LINK_INVALID check (and the FCS check before the reset) so an invalidated link can no longer be kept alive by incoming packets."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-10675",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-22T20:16:42.237",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-10675",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-22T19:32:13.205050Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-21T22:16:59.800",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3f3c37edf80262b838ef5402fec9880c07892e4e"
    },
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4rwg-6mr4-55hc"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Undergoing Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-400"
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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