FKIE_CVE-2026-10666

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-12 17:16 - Updated: 2026-10-24 22:10
Summary
parse_ipv4() in subsys/net/ip/utils.c (reached via net_ipaddr_parse() for strings of the form "a.b.c.d:port") copies the port substring into a fixed 17-byte stack buffer (char ipaddr[NET_IPV4_ADDR_LEN + 1]) using a length of str_len - end - 1, where str_len is the full, unbounded input length and end is only the (<=15-byte) offset of the ':' delimiter. Because the destination size is never consulted, a crafted address string with a long suffix after the colon (e.g. "1.2.3.4:" followed by hundreds of bytes) causes an out-of-bounds stack write whose length and contents are fully attacker-controlled (memcpy of the suffix plus a trailing NUL), enabling memory corruption and at minimum a denial of service, and potentially control-flow hijack. The parser is reached from the standard socket API (zsock_getaddrinfo / literal-address resolution), DNS server-string configuration, and the eswifi Wi-Fi co-processor DNS-response path, so an application that resolves a network-influenced address string is exposed. The bug was introduced when the parser was added (Zephyr v1.9.0) and shipped in all releases through v4.4.0. The fix removes the unbounded copy and validates the port length before copying into a small dedicated buffer. Note: the equivalent IPv6 "[addr]:port" path in parse_ipv6() retains the same unbounded copy at this commit and remains a separate, still-reachable instance of the defect.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
zephyrproject zephyr *

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/net/ip/utils.c"
          ],
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.3.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1.9.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.4.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.4.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "82FE267F-C88E-42A5-A503-69ECB6A7879A",
              "versionEndIncluding": "4.4.1",
              "versionStartIncluding": "1.9.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "parse_ipv4() in subsys/net/ip/utils.c (reached via net_ipaddr_parse() for strings of the form \"a.b.c.d:port\") copies the port substring into a fixed 17-byte stack buffer (char ipaddr[NET_IPV4_ADDR_LEN + 1]) using a length of str_len - end - 1, where str_len is the full, unbounded input length and end is only the (\u003c=15-byte) offset of the \u0027:\u0027 delimiter. Because the destination size is never consulted, a crafted address string with a long suffix after the colon (e.g. \"1.2.3.4:\" followed by hundreds of bytes) causes an out-of-bounds stack write whose length and contents are fully attacker-controlled (memcpy of the suffix plus a trailing NUL), enabling memory corruption and at minimum a denial of service, and potentially control-flow hijack. The parser is reached from the standard socket API (zsock_getaddrinfo / literal-address resolution), DNS server-string configuration, and the eswifi Wi-Fi co-processor DNS-response path, so an application that resolves a network-influenced address string is exposed. The bug was introduced when the parser was added (Zephyr v1.9.0) and shipped in all releases through v4.4.0. The fix removes the unbounded copy and validates the port length before copying into a small dedicated buffer. Note: the equivalent IPv6 \"[addr]:port\" path in parse_ipv6() retains the same unbounded copy at this commit and remains a separate, still-reachable instance of the defect."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "parse_ipv4() en subsys/net/ip/utils.c (alcanzado a trav\u00e9s de net_ipaddr_parse() para cadenas de la forma \u2019a.b.c.d:port\u2019) copia la subcadena del puerto en un b\u00fafer de pila fijo de 17 bytes (char ipaddr[NET_IPV4_ADDR_LEN + 1]) usando una longitud de str_len - end - 1, donde str_len es la longitud de entrada completa y sin l\u00edmites y end es solo el desplazamiento (menor o igual que 15 bytes) del delimitador \u2019:\u2019. Debido a que el tama\u00f1o de destino nunca se consulta, una cadena de direcci\u00f3n manipulada con un sufijo largo despu\u00e9s de los dos puntos (por ejemplo, \u20191.2.3.4:\u2019 seguido de cientos de bytes) causa una escritura fuera de l\u00edmites en la pila cuya longitud y contenido est\u00e1n totalmente controlados por el atacante (memcpy del sufijo m\u00e1s un NUL final), lo que permite la corrupci\u00f3n de memoria y, como m\u00ednimo, una denegaci\u00f3n de servicio, y potencialmente un secuestro del flujo de control. El analizador se alcanza desde la API de socket est\u00e1ndar (zsock_getaddrinfo / resoluci\u00f3n de direcci\u00f3n literal), la configuraci\u00f3n de cadena de servidor DNS y la ruta de respuesta DNS del coprocesador Wi-Fi eswifi, por lo que una aplicaci\u00f3n que resuelve una cadena de direcci\u00f3n influenciada por la red est\u00e1 expuesta. El error se introdujo cuando se a\u00f1adi\u00f3 el analizador (Zephyr v1.9.0) y se distribuy\u00f3 en todas las versiones hasta la v4.4.0. La correcci\u00f3n elimina la copia sin l\u00edmites y valida la longitud del puerto antes de copiar en un peque\u00f1o b\u00fafer dedicado. Nota: la ruta IPv6 equivalente \u2019[addr]:port\u2019 en parse_ipv6() retiene la misma copia sin l\u00edmites en este commit y sigue siendo una instancia separada y a\u00fan alcanzable del defecto."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-10666",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T22:10:00.210",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-10666",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-13T16:04:57.176740Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-12T17:16:24.550",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/1c8d19a51f9a3c1be6de53854c8ad8c2720a0f48"
    },
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/6e119a636a57be449ea21e73cad762ebc6f5ff7a"
    },
    {
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-532c-7g7f-jhmh"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-532c-7g7f-jhmh"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-121"
        }
      ],
      "source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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