FKIE_CVE-2026-104014

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-07 12:17 - Updated: 2026-11-07 19:17
Summary
The Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 2.1.0. This is due to the plugin's password-reset finalization endpoint (the wp_ajax_nopriv_ceovw_update_new_password action handled by CEOVW_AJAX::update_new_password()) authorizing the reset solely by the presence of a database row marking an email as 'VERIFIED', with no timestamp check, no session binding, and no per-reset token — combined with mark_otp_as_verified_for_reset() leaving the row in that state after a user enters their code (abandoning the flow leaves the row behind), and a scheduled 'ceovw_cleanup_expired_otps_event' cron that has no add_action() handler anywhere in the plugin so cleanup never runs. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to take over any account whose owner previously requested and verified a password-reset code and did not immediately finish choosing a new password — the attacker needs only the victim's email address and a nonce that the plugin itself localizes publicly into the CEOVW_APP global on the WooCommerce account page for logged-out visitors, after which they call the endpoint, overwrite the victim's password, and are returned a live wordpress_logged_in_ session cookie for that user (full site takeover if the account is an administrator).
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce",
          "vendor": "naimurrahmannahid",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "2.1.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 2.1.0. This is due to the plugin\u0027s password-reset finalization endpoint (the wp_ajax_nopriv_ceovw_update_new_password action handled by CEOVW_AJAX::update_new_password()) authorizing the reset solely by the presence of a database row marking an email as \u0027VERIFIED\u0027, with no timestamp check, no session binding, and no per-reset token \u2014 combined with mark_otp_as_verified_for_reset() leaving the row in that state after a user enters their code (abandoning the flow leaves the row behind), and a scheduled \u0027ceovw_cleanup_expired_otps_event\u0027 cron that has no add_action() handler anywhere in the plugin so cleanup never runs. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to take over any account whose owner previously requested and verified a password-reset code and did not immediately finish choosing a new password \u2014 the attacker needs only the victim\u0027s email address and a nonce that the plugin itself localizes publicly into the CEOVW_APP global on the WooCommerce account page for logged-out visitors, after which they call the endpoint, overwrite the victim\u0027s password, and are returned a live wordpress_logged_in_ session cookie for that user (full site takeover if the account is an administrator)."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-104014",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-07T19:17:17.340",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-104014",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-11-07T18:11:18.295742Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-11-07T12:17:41.313",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/naimur-email-otp-for-woocommerce/tags/2.1.0/includes/class-ajax.php#L10"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/naimur-email-otp-for-woocommerce/tags/2.1.0/includes/class-ajax.php#L163"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/naimur-email-otp-for-woocommerce/tags/2.1.0/includes/class-security.php#L72"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/naimur-email-otp-for-woocommerce/tags/2.1.0/includes/class-security.php#L77"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/naimur-email-otp-for-woocommerce/tags/2.1.0/naimur-email-otp-for-woocommerce.php#L38"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/naimur-email-otp-for-woocommerce/tags/2.1.1/includes/class-ajax.php"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b29918de-22a2-424f-ad86-ad83874ca81a?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-287"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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