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  <updated>2026-11-09T17:27:54.691823+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-104014</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-104014 — Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce &lt;= 2.1.0 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass to Account Takeover via…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-09T17:27:54.692930+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> naimurrahmannahid Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce</p>
<p>The Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 2.1.0. This is due to the plugin's password-reset finalization endpoint (the wp_ajax_nopriv_ceovw_update_new_password action handled by CEOVW_AJAX::update_new_password()) authorizing the reset solely by the presence of a database row marking an email as 'VERIFIED', with no timestamp check, no session binding, and no per-reset token — combined with mark_otp_as_verified_for_reset() leaving the row in that state after a user enters their code (abandoning the flow leaves the row behind), and a scheduled 'ceovw_cleanup_expired_otps_event' cron that has no add_action() handler anywhere in the plugin so cleanup never runs. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to take over any account whose owner previously requested and verified a password-reset code and did not immediately finish choosing a new password — the attacker needs only the victim's email address and a nonce that the plugin itself localizes publicly into the CEOVW_APP global on the WooCommerce account page for logged-out visitors, after which they call the endpoint, overwrite the victim's password, and are returned a live wordpress_logged_in_ session cookie for that user (full site takeover if the account is an administrator).</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-104014"/>
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