FKIE_CVE-2025-34337
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-11-19 17:15 - Updated: 2026-10-19 13:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/eGovFramework/egovframe-common-components",
"product": "eGovFramework/egovframe-common-components",
"repo": "https://github.com/eGovFramework/egovframe-common-components",
"vendor": "eGovFramework/egovframe-common-components",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "4.3.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "eGovFramework/egovframe-common-components versions up to and including 4.3.1 includes\u00a0Web Editor image upload and related file delivery functionality that uses symmetric encryption to protect URL parameters, but exposes an encryption oracle that allows attackers to generate valid ciphertext for chosen values. The image upload endpoints /utl/wed/insertImage.do and /utl/wed/insertImageCk.do encrypt server-side paths, filenames, and MIME types and embed them directly into a download URL that is returned to the client. Because these same encrypted parameters are trusted by other endpoints, such as /utl/web/imageSrc.do and /cmm/fms/getImage.do, an unauthenticated attacker can abuse the upload functionality to obtain encrypted representations of attacker-chosen identifiers and then replay those ciphertext values to file-serving APIs. This design failure allows an attacker to bypass access controls that rely solely on the secrecy of encrypted parameters and retrieve arbitrary stored files that are otherwise expected to require an existing session or specific authorization context. KISA/KrCERT has identified this unpatched vulnerability as \"KVE-2023-5281.\""
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "eGovFramework/egovframe-common-components versiones hasta e incluyendo 4.3.1 incluye la funcionalidad de carga de im\u00e1genes del Editor Web y entrega de archivos relacionada que utiliza cifrado sim\u00e9trico para proteger los par\u00e1metros de URL, pero expone un or\u00e1culo de cifrado que permite a los atacantes generar texto cifrado v\u00e1lido para valores elegidos. Los endpoints de carga de im\u00e1genes /utl/wed/insertImage.do y /utl/wed/insertImageCk.do cifran rutas del lado del servidor, nombres de archivo y tipos MIME y los incrustan directamente en una URL de descarga que se devuelve al cliente. Debido a que estos mismos par\u00e1metros cifrados son confiados por otros endpoints, como /utl/web/imageSrc.do y /cmm/fms/getImage.do, un atacante no autenticado puede abusar de la funcionalidad de carga para obtener representaciones cifradas de identificadores elegidos por el atacante y luego reproducir esos valores de texto cifrado en las API de servicio de archivos. Este fallo de dise\u00f1o permite a un atacante eludir los controles de acceso que dependen \u00fanicamente del secreto de los par\u00e1metros cifrados y recuperar archivos almacenados arbitrarios que, de otro modo, se esperar\u00eda que requirieran una sesi\u00f3n existente o un contexto de autorizaci\u00f3n espec\u00edfico. KISA/KrCERT ha identificado esta vulnerabilidad sin parchear como \u201cKVE-2023-5281\u201d."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-34337",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T13:10:00.110",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 8.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-34337",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-11-19T16:41:23.612236Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-11-19T17:15:49.257",
"references": [
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://github.com/eGovFramework/egovframe-common-components"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2025-egovframe.txt"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-11-20-egovframe-2-vulnerabilities.html"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://www.egovframe.go.kr/eng/sub.do?menuNo=2"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/egovframework-unauthenticated-encryption-oracle-via-web-editor-image-upload-endpoints"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-345"
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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