FKIE_CVE-2025-34209
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-09-29 21:15 - Updated: 2026-10-18 21:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| vasion | virtual_appliance_application | * | |
| vasion | virtual_appliance_host | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"Docker images \u2013 embedded GPG key pair",
"Firmware\u2011update signing workflow"
],
"product": "Print Virtual Appliance Host",
"vendor": "Vasion",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "22.0.862",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"Docker images \u2013 embedded GPG key pair",
"Firmware\u2011update signing workflow"
],
"product": "Print Application",
"vendor": "Vasion",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "20.0.2014",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:vasion:virtual_appliance_application:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D4645804-F97F-4F03-BEBC-C5312589E264",
"versionEndExcluding": "20.0.2014",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:vasion:virtual_appliance_host:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D2D5B303-AB55-4571-ACF5-4702AA92AB0E",
"versionEndExcluding": "22.0.862",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to 22.0.862 and Application prior to 20.0.2014 (VA and SaaS deployments)\u00a0contain Docker images with the private GPG key and passphrase for the account *no\u2011reply+virtual\u2011appliance@printerlogic.com*.\u00a0The key is stored in cleartext and the passphrase is hardcoded in files.\u00a0An attacker with administrative access to the appliance can extract the private key, import it into their own system, and subsequently decrypt GPG-encrypted files and sign arbitrary firmware update packages.\u00a0A maliciously signed update can be uploaded by an admin\u2011level attacker and will be executed by the appliance, giving the attacker full control of the virtual appliance.\u00a0This vulnerability has been identified by the vendor as: V-2023-010 \u2014 Hardcoded Private Key."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El host de dispositivo virtual Vasion Print (anteriormente PrinterLogic) anterior a la versi\u00f3n 22.0.862 y la aplicaci\u00f3n anterior a la versi\u00f3n 20.0.2014 (implementaciones VA y SaaS) contienen im\u00e1genes de Docker con la clave GPG privada y la frase de contrase\u00f1a para la cuenta no?reply+virtual?appliance@printerlogic.com. La clave se almacena en texto claro y la frase de contrase\u00f1a est\u00e1 codificada de forma r\u00edgida en los archivos. Un atacante con acceso administrativo al dispositivo puede extraer la clave privada, importarla a su propio sistema y posteriormente descifrar archivos cifrados con GPG y firmar paquetes de actualizaci\u00f3n de firmware arbitrarios. Una actualizaci\u00f3n firmada maliciosamente puede ser cargada por un atacante con nivel de administrador y ser\u00e1 ejecutada por el dispositivo, otorgando al atacante control total del dispositivo virtual. Esta vulnerabilidad ha sido identificada por el proveedor como: V-2023-010 - Clave privada codificada de forma r\u00edgida."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-34209",
"lastModified": "2026-10-18T21:10:00.120",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.2,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 9.4,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-34209",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-09-30T13:33:57.998509Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-09-29T21:15:34.447",
"references": [
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/saas/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/va/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-04-08-vasion-printerlogic-83-vulnerabilities.html#va-private-gpg-key"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vasion-print-printerlogic-hardcoded-gpg-private-key"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-04-08-vasion-printerlogic-83-vulnerabilities.html#va-private-gpg-key"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-798"
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.