FKIE_CVE-2025-22248
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-05-13 10:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 08:45
Severity
Summary
The bitnami/pgpool Docker image, and the bitnami/postgres-ha k8s chart, under default configurations, comes with an 'repmgr' user that allows unauthenticated access to the database inside the cluster. The PGPOOL_SR_CHECK_USER is the user that Pgpool itself uses to perform streaming replication checks against nodes, and should not be at trust level. This allows to log into a PostgreSQL database using the repgmr user without authentication. If Pgpool is exposed externally, a potential attacker could use this user to get access to the service. This is also present within the bitnami/postgres-ha Kubernetes Helm chart.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security@vmware.com | https://github.com/bitnami/charts/security/advisories/GHSA-mx38-x658-5fwj | Vendor Advisory |
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| broadcom | bitnami | * | |
| broadcom | bitnami\/pgpool | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "bitnami/pgpool",
"product": "Bitnami",
"vendor": "VMware",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.6.0-debian-12-r8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "*",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "bitnami/postgres-ha",
"product": "Bitnami",
"vendor": "VMware",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "16.0.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "*",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@vmware.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:broadcom:bitnami:*:*:*:*:*:postgresql:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "B227ABBF-D7EE-4E2C-ACCC-893DF02D8010",
"versionEndExcluding": "16.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:broadcom:bitnami\\/pgpool:*:*:*:*:*:docker:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "7D03A055-CE7B-4DA8-BC58-CE5EF3C448AC",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.6.0-1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The bitnami/pgpool\u00a0Docker image, and the bitnami/postgres-ha\u00a0k8s chart, under default configurations, comes with an \u0027repmgr\u0027 user that allows unauthenticated access to the database inside the cluster.\u00a0The PGPOOL_SR_CHECK_USER\u00a0is the user that Pgpool itself uses to perform streaming replication checks against nodes, and should not be at trust\u00a0level. This allows to log into a PostgreSQL database using the repgmr\u00a0user without authentication. If Pgpool is exposed externally, a potential attacker could use this user to get access to the service. This is also present within the bitnami/postgres-ha\u00a0Kubernetes Helm chart."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "La imagen de Docker bitnami/pgpool y el diagrama k8s bitnami/postgres-ha, en la configuraci\u00f3n predeterminada, incluyen el usuario \"repmgr\" que permite el acceso no autenticado a la base de datos dentro del cl\u00faster. PGPOOL_SR_CHECK_USER es el usuario que Pgpool utiliza para realizar comprobaciones de replicaci\u00f3n en streaming en los nodos y no debe tener un nivel de confianza. Esto permite iniciar sesi\u00f3n en una base de datos PostgreSQL con el usuario \"repmgr\" sin autenticaci\u00f3n. Si Pgpool se expone externamente, un atacante podr\u00eda usar este usuario para acceder al servicio. Esto tambi\u00e9n est\u00e1 presente en el diagrama Helm de Kubernetes bitnami/postgres-ha."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-22248",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T08:45:54.693",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 9.4,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security@vmware.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-22248",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-05-13T13:10:00.979591Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-05-13T10:15:22.600",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@vmware.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/bitnami/charts/security/advisories/GHSA-mx38-x658-5fwj"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@vmware.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-1188"
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.