FKIE_CVE-2024-51756
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-11-05 22:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 08:06
Severity
Summary
The cap-std project is organized around the eponymous `cap-std` crate, and develops libraries to make it easy to write capability-based code. cap-std's filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as "COM1", "COM2", "LPT0", "LPT1", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as "COM¹", "COM²", "LPT⁰", "LPT¹", and so on. Untrusted filesystem paths could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them provide access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports. The bug is fixed in #371, which is published in cap-primitives 3.4.1, cap-std 3.4.1, and cap-async-std 3.4.1. There are no known workarounds for this issue. Affected Windows users are recommended to upgrade.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "cap-std",
"vendor": "bytecodealliance",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 3.4.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The cap-std project is organized around the eponymous `cap-std` crate, and develops libraries to make it easy to write capability-based code. cap-std\u0027s filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as \"COM1\", \"COM2\", \"LPT0\", \"LPT1\", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as \"COM\u00b9\", \"COM\u00b2\", \"LPT\u2070\", \"LPT\u00b9\", and so on. Untrusted filesystem paths could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them provide access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports. The bug is fixed in #371, which is published in cap-primitives 3.4.1, cap-std 3.4.1, and cap-async-std 3.4.1. There are no known workarounds for this issue. Affected Windows users are recommended to upgrade."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El proyecto cap-std est\u00e1 organizado en torno al caj\u00f3n hom\u00f3nimo `cap-std`, y desarrolla librer\u00edas para facilitar la escritura de c\u00f3digo basado en capacidades. La implementaci\u00f3n del sandbox del sistema de archivos de cap-std en Windows bloquea el acceso a nombres de archivos de dispositivos especiales como \"COM1\", \"COM2\", \"LPT0\", \"LPT1\", etc., sin embargo, no bloquea el acceso a los nombres de archivos de dispositivos especiales que utilizan d\u00edgitos en super\u00edndice, como \"COM\u00b9\", \"COM\u00b2\", \"LPT?\", \"LPT\u00b9\", etc. Las rutas del sistema de archivos no confiables podr\u00edan eludir el sandbox y acceder a los dispositivos a trav\u00e9s de esos nombres de archivos de dispositivos especiales con d\u00edgitos en super\u00edndice, y a trav\u00e9s de ellos proporcionar acceso a dispositivos perif\u00e9ricos conectados a la computadora o recursos de red asignados a esos dispositivos. Esto puede incluir m\u00f3dems, impresoras, impresoras de red y cualquier otro dispositivo conectado a un puerto serial o paralelo, incluidos los puertos seriales USB emulados. El error se corrigi\u00f3 en el n.\u00b0 371, que se public\u00f3 en cap-primitives 3.4.1, cap-std 3.4.1 y cap-async-std 3.4.1. No se conocen workarounds para este problema. Se recomienda a los usuarios de Windows afectados que actualicen."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-51756",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T08:06:16.437",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 2.3,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-51756",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-11-06T14:39:46.629668Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-11-05T22:15:21.817",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_8859-1"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/commit/dcc3818039761331fbeacbb3a40c542b65b5ebf7"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/pull/371"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/security/advisories/GHSA-hxf5-99xg-86hw"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#naming-conventions"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-22"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.