FKIE_CVE-2024-45810

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-09-20 00:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:54
Severity
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
Envoy is a cloud-native high-performance edge/middle/service proxy. Envoy will crash when the http async client is handling `sendLocalReply` under some circumstance, e.g., websocket upgrade, and requests mirroring. The http async client will crash during the `sendLocalReply()` in http async client, one reason is http async client is duplicating the status code, another one is the destroy of router is called at the destructor of the async stream, while the stream is deferred deleted at first. There will be problems that the stream decoder is destroyed but its reference is called in `router.onDestroy()`, causing segment fault. This will impact ext_authz if the `upgrade` and `connection` header are allowed, and request mirrorring. This issue has been addressed in versions 1.31.2, 1.30.6, 1.29.9, and 1.28.7. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-qm74-x36m-555qExploit, Third Party Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
envoyproxy envoy *
envoyproxy envoy *
envoyproxy envoy *
envoyproxy envoy *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "envoy",
          "vendor": "envoyproxy",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.28.7"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.29.0, \u003c 1.29.9"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.30.0, \u003c 1.30.6"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.31.0, \u003c 1.31.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "C5E423BE-4022-47AB-A5D4-B218627517DD",
              "versionEndExcluding": "1.28.7",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "E442EF13-A99D-42B9-BC76-AC398C32D132",
              "versionEndExcluding": "1.29.9",
              "versionStartIncluding": "1.29.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "D9685C62-CFE4-43C5-B0C2-1C6722FB4F64",
              "versionEndExcluding": "1.30.6",
              "versionStartIncluding": "1.30.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "C765FFC0-2FF7-4318-A347-2AFCAD0E7C74",
              "versionEndExcluding": "1.31.2",
              "versionStartIncluding": "1.31.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Envoy is a cloud-native high-performance edge/middle/service proxy. Envoy will crash when the http async client is handling `sendLocalReply` under some circumstance, e.g., websocket upgrade, and requests mirroring. The http async client will crash during the `sendLocalReply()` in http async client, one reason is http async client is duplicating the status code, another one is the destroy of router is called at the destructor of the async stream, while the stream is deferred deleted at first. There will be problems that the stream decoder is destroyed but its reference is called in `router.onDestroy()`, causing segment fault. This will impact ext_authz if the `upgrade` and `connection` header are allowed, and request mirrorring. This issue has been addressed in versions 1.31.2, 1.30.6, 1.29.9, and 1.28.7. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Envoy es un proxy de servicio/borde/medio de alto rendimiento nativo de la nube. Envoy se bloquear\u00e1 cuando el cliente asincr\u00f3nico http est\u00e9 manejando `sendLocalReply` en alguna circunstancia, por ejemplo, actualizaci\u00f3n de websocket y duplicaci\u00f3n de solicitudes. El cliente asincr\u00f3nico http se bloquear\u00e1 durante `sendLocalReply()` en el cliente asincr\u00f3nico http, una raz\u00f3n es que el cliente asincr\u00f3nico http est\u00e1 duplicando el c\u00f3digo de estado, otra es que la destrucci\u00f3n del enrutador se llama en el destructor de la transmisi\u00f3n asincr\u00f3nica, mientras que la transmisi\u00f3n se elimina diferida al principio. Habr\u00e1 problemas si se destruye el decodificador de transmisi\u00f3n, pero se llama a su referencia en `router.onDestroy()`, lo que provoca una falla de segmento. Esto afectar\u00e1 a ext_authz si se permiten los encabezados `upgrade` y `connection`, y solicitar\u00e1 duplicaci\u00f3n. Este problema se ha solucionado en las versiones 1.31.2, 1.30.6, 1.29.9 y 1.28.7. Se recomienda a los usuarios que actualicen. No se conocen workarounds para esta vulnerabilidad."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-45810",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:54:51.657",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2024-45810",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2024-09-20T17:17:32.357987Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-09-20T00:15:03.153",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-qm74-x36m-555q"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-119"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    },
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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