FKIE_CVE-2024-45410
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2024-09-19 23:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 07:54
Severity
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/
Summary
Traefik is a golang, Cloud Native Application Proxy. When a HTTP request is processed by Traefik, certain HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-Host or X-Forwarded-Port are added by Traefik before the request is routed to the application. For a HTTP client, it should not be possible to remove or modify these headers. Since the application trusts the value of these headers, security implications might arise, if they can be modified. For HTTP/1.1, however, it was found that some of theses custom headers can indeed be removed and in certain cases manipulated. The attack relies on the HTTP/1.1 behavior, that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been addressed in release versions 2.11.9 and 3.1.3. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "traefik",
"vendor": "traefik",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 2.11.9"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 3.0.0, \u003c 3.1.3"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
},
{
"affectedData": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "traefik",
"vendor": "traefik",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.11.9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.1.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.0.0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D8862E39-A57C-4CD5-A289-A853D9402298",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.11.9",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "31D16308-8F47-4EAC-B102-1FDEA4B3F9F1",
"versionEndExcluding": "3.1.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "3.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Traefik is a golang, Cloud Native Application Proxy. When a HTTP request is processed by Traefik, certain HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-Host or X-Forwarded-Port are added by Traefik before the request is routed to the application. For a HTTP client, it should not be possible to remove or modify these headers. Since the application trusts the value of these headers, security implications might arise, if they can be modified. For HTTP/1.1, however, it was found that some of theses custom headers can indeed be removed and in certain cases manipulated. The attack relies on the HTTP/1.1 behavior, that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been addressed in release versions 2.11.9 and 3.1.3. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Traefik es un proxy de aplicaci\u00f3n nativo de la nube (golang). Cuando Traefik procesa una solicitud HTTP, Traefik agrega ciertos encabezados HTTP como X-Forwarded-Host o X-Forwarded-Port antes de que la solicitud se env\u00ede a la aplicaci\u00f3n. Para un cliente HTTP, no deber\u00eda ser posible eliminar o modificar estos encabezados. Dado que la aplicaci\u00f3n conf\u00eda en el valor de estos encabezados, podr\u00edan surgir implicaciones de seguridad si se pueden modificar. Sin embargo, para HTTP/1.1, se descubri\u00f3 que algunos de estos encabezados personalizados s\u00ed se pueden eliminar y, en ciertos casos, manipular. El ataque se basa en el comportamiento de HTTP/1.1, que permite definir los encabezados como salto a salto a trav\u00e9s del encabezado de conexi\u00f3n HTTP. Este problema se ha solucionado en las versiones de lanzamiento 2.11.9 y 3.1.3. Se recomienda a los usuarios que actualicen. No se conocen workarounds para esta vulnerabilidad."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-45410",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T07:54:09.780",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2024-45410",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2024-09-20T14:58:01.711908Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2024-09-19T23:15:11.480",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.9"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.1.3"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-345"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-348"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-345"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.